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Abstract 
Empirical research on the social psychological antecedents of collective action has been 
conducted almost exclusively in democratic societies, where activism is relatively safe. The 
present research examines the psychological predictors of collective action intentions in 
contexts where resistance is met with significant repression by the authorities. Combining 
recent advancements in the collective action literature, our model examines the unique 
predictive roles of emotion (anger and fear), political, identity consolidation and participative 
efficacies, politicized identification and moral obligation, over and above past participation. It 
further investigates how these variables are shaped by perceptions of risks due to repression. 
Four survey studies test this model among protesters in Russia (N = 305), Ukraine (N = 136), 
Hong Kong (N = 115), and Turkey (N = 296). Meta-analytic integration of the findings 
highlights that, unlike in most current accounts of collective action, protesters in these 
contexts are not primarily driven by political efficacy. Rather, their involvement is contingent 
upon beliefs in the ability of protest to build a movement (identity consolidation and 
participative efficacies) and motivated by outrage at state repression, identification with the 
social movement, and a sense of moral obligation to act on their behalf. Results also confirm 
that risks due to state repression spur rather than quell resistance by increasing outrage, 
politicized identification, identity consolidation and participative efficacies, and moral 
obligation. The implications of these findings for models of collective action and our 
understanding of the motives underlying engagement in repressive contexts are discussed.    
 
 
Keywords: Collective action, Risky contexts, Efficacy, Emotions, Politicized identification, 
Moral obligation  
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 “I do share part of my life, part of my thinking, part of my ideology with the people 
around me… I wanted to redress the injustice that was inflicted on us in this country… 
We were all in this together… getting beaten in the same way… it was likely for any of us 
to lose his life for the sake of my goal, which is also his goal and all the protesters’ goal. 
It kind of gives that sense of obligation. I didn’t mind then to sacrifice my life for the sake 
of this goal… It’s kind of a shared thing between us…”  
An Egyptian activist (Ayanian & Tausch, 2013) 
 
Throughout history, citizens have confronted societal injustices and challenged 
authoritarian and repressive regimes, often risking arrest, injury, and even their lives. The 
conditions that give rise to such resistance have been studied widely across the social 
sciences. The social movement and civil resistance literatures have provided many insights 
into the macro- and meso-level factors involved by identifying the political and economic 
contexts and cultural structures that foster (or hinder) mass mobilization, as well as 
documenting the tactics and stages of resistance campaigns (see Schock, 2013, for a review).  
The analytical focus within social psychology has been on the micro-level of analysis; 
that is, the psychological factors that determine individuals’ motivations to participate in such 
action. Here, an individual is considered to engage in collective action “any time that she or 
he is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the 
conditions of the entire group” (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990, p. 995). The social-
psychological literature on collective action is vast and diverse, offering numerous 
explanations and identifying an array of contributing psychological processes (see van 
Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk, 2011, for a review). A comprehensive meta-analysis 
has highlighted three groups of psychological factors that uniquely predict action intentions, 
namely injustice appraisals and their emotional counterparts, the perceived efficacy of 
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collective action, and identification with the aggrieved group or social movement (van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Recent refinements have examined the contributions of 
distinct emotions (e.g., Miller, Cronin, Garcia & Branscombe, 2009; Tausch, Becker, Spears 
et al., 2011), distinguished different aspects of efficacy (Hornsey, Blackwood, Louis, et al., 
2006; van Zomeren, Saguy, & Schellhaas, 2013), and examined novel bases of identity 
(McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009).  
While these developments are informative and inspiring, the research available to date 
is also limited. In fact, the vast majority of social psychological studies on collective action 
were conducted in Western, democratic societies, where engagement in protest is relatively 
risk-free and unlikely to be met with severe repression (for recent exceptions, see Ayanian & 
Tausch, 2016; Baysu & Phalet, 2017; Gulevich, Sarieva, Nevruev, & Yagiyayev, 2017; 
Chayinska, Minescu, & McGarty, 2017). As the factors fostering engagement seem to differ 
depending on the risks involved (e.g., DiGrazia, 2014; McAdam, 1986; Wiltfang & 
McAdam, 1991), it remains unknown how previous findings generalize to high-risk contexts.  
The present research aims to address this gap in the literature. Specifically, we pursue 
three main goals: First, across four contexts where activists faced substantial repression from 
the authorities (Russia, Ukraine, Hong Kong, and Turkey), we test a comprehensive 
predictive model of collective action intentions, taking into account the roles of distinct 
emotions (anger and fear), facets of efficacy (political efficacy, identity consolidation 
efficacy, and participative efficacy), and group identification. Second, to determine how the 
risks associated with activism feed into the psychological antecedents and impact on 
willingness to get engaged, we include perceived risks of collective action as a distal 
predictor in our model. This allows us to assess, from a psychological perspective, the idea 
that sanctions aimed to discourage participation often backfire and spur further action (see 
Martin, 2007, 2015; Opp & Roehl, 1990), and to shed light on the psychological mechanisms 
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underpinning this well-documented backlash effect. Finally, we investigate the role of moral 
obligation, a rarely examined variable in the collective action literature (see Sabucedo, Dono, 
Alzate, & Seoane, 2018). A sense of moral obligation emerged as a key motivator in our 
interviews of activists during the 2011 uprising and 2013 coup in Egypt (Ayanian & Tausch, 
2013). As illustrated in the quote above, moral obligation is closely intertwined with injustice 
appraisals, instrumental motivations, and shared identities. In line with previous work, we 
conceptualize moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of action intentions. Before 
outlining our hypotheses, we review the literature relevant to our research goals.  
Core Psychological Drivers of Collective Action 
Three groups of psychological variables, rooted in three theoretical traditions, 
constitute core motivators that uniquely predict action intentions (see Thomas, Mavor, & 
McGarty, 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Relative deprivation theory (Folger, 1986; 
Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002) has highlighted the importance of shared 
grievances and emotional responses to deprivation as the catalyst of collective action (see 
Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin & Bialosiewicz, 2012). Emotions have received renewed attention 
with the development of intergroup emotion theory (IET; Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 
2001; Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2018; Smith, 1993), which proposes 
that, in situations where individuals categorize themselves as members of a social group, 
group-related events become self-relevant and arouse specific group-based emotions together 
with their associated action tendencies. Justice-related emotions such as anger and outrage, 
which result from appraisals of unfairness and external blame and arouse confrontational 
tendencies (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989), are widely regarded as central to protest 
behavior (e.g., van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & 
Leach, 2004). The predictive power of affect was confirmed in van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) 
meta-analysis, which indicated that measures capturing the affective experience of injustice 
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yielded significantly stronger effect sizes than non-affective measures (e.g., perceived 
disadvantage).  
Other emotions that have been considered relevant to group behavior within the 
intergroup emotions theory framework have received less attention in the collective action 
literature. Fear in particular, which motivates withdrawal behavior in response to uncertain or 
threatening events (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Osborne, Smith, & Huo, 
2012), is relevant in high-risk contexts as it captures the psychological response that underlies 
deterrence effects (see Saab & Ayoub, 2017). Experimental work has also suggested that the 
impact of anger may be overestimated when fear is not considered (Miller et al., 2009).  
Complementing this line of work are approaches that focus on the instrumental 
aspects of collective action. These have considered both internal mobilization resources (e.g., 
material and human resources; see Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997; McCarthy & Zald, 
1977), as well as (perceived) structural constraints (e.g., the (in)stability of group hierarchy; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Psychologically, these manifest as a sense of collective efficacy, 
defined as “people’s collective shared belief of being able to solve their group-related 
problems by unified effort” (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999, p. 232). There is 
extensive evidence that engagement in collective action is a function of a subjective sense of 
collective efficacy (e.g., Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Berman & Wittig, 2004; van Zomeren 
et al., 2004). This is also confirmed in van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis, which 
yielded a significant positive effect.   
The meta-analysis and recent research (Cichocka, Gosrka, Jost, Sutton, & Bilewicz, 
2018; Osborne, Yogeeswaran, & Sibley, 2015) also indicate, however, that there is 
substantial heterogeneity for the effect of efficacy. Moreover, some research suggests that 
general group efficacy is unrelated or even negatively related to intentions to engage in more 
radical collective action (Tausch et al., 2011). These findings may seem counter-intuitive 
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given that collective action is by definition a goal-driven behavior. However, a number of 
studies have highlighted the importance of defining efficacy (which is typically assessed in 
terms of political effectiveness) less narrowly and taking into account a variety of motives. 
Hornsey et al. (2006), for example, demonstrated that the efficacy of collective action is 
judged according to a range of criteria, including whether protest has the ability to influence 
third parties, to increase solidarity and facilitate the development of a social movement, or the 
extent to which it allows expressing one’s values, each of which independently predict action 
intentions. Building on this work, Saab, Tausch, Spears, and Cheung (2015) distinguished 
political efficacy from identity consolidation efficacy, which conceptualizes the efficacy of 
action in strengthening the protesting group, and showed that both forms of efficacy play a 
role in motivating engagement. Van Zomeren et al. (2013) added a further refinement of the 
efficacy construct. Based on the idea that people might be motivated to “free ride” when the 
perceived efficacy of collective action is high (Olson, 1968), these authors demonstrated that 
participative efficacy, defined as an individual’s belief that their efforts makes an incremental 
contribution to action success, adds to the explanation of action intentions.  
A third approach emphasizes the importance of identification with the aggrieved 
group in mobilizing action (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
To the extent that a particular social identity is contextually salient and meaningful, 
individuals align their beliefs, interest, and behaviors with those of the group (Turner et al., 
1987). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) further states that identification varies 
as a function of social-structural factors and is strengthened when one’s group is perceived as 
suffering an illegitimate disadvantage. The awareness of shared grievances and the attribution 
of blame to an external agent results in the politicization of identities (Simon & Klandermans, 
2001), which are of particular importance for protest behavior as they are accompanied by an 
internalization of the goals and norms of the social movement (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). 
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Politicized identification has consistently been shown to better predict engagement than 
identification with the broader disadvantaged group (see van Zomeren et al., 2008).  
Moral Obligation as a Proximal Predictor of Engagement 
One aim of the present studies is to demonstrate that injustice, efficacy beliefs and 
group identification foster action by creating a sense of moral obligation to participate, that is, 
the belief that taking action is the ‘right thing to do’ or ‘ought to be done’ (Vilas & Sabucedo, 
2012). A sense of moral duty or obligation is a central concept in moral philosophy (see 
Zwart, 1997) and features in many theories of human behavior (Bandura, 1991; Sabucedok, 
2002; Zimbardo, 2007). However, only a handful of empirical studies have examined the role 
of this variable in participation in collective action. For example, Stern, Dietz, Abel, 
Guagnano, and Kalof (1999) demonstrated that individuals who accept a movement’s values, 
believe that these values are threatened, and believe that their personal actions can help to 
restore these values, experience an obligation to engage in pro-movement action. Other work 
has underlined the importance of group processes and social identities in creating this sense 
of obligation. The devoted actor framework (see Atran, 2016; Atran & Ginges, 2015), for 
example, posits that actors in intractable conflicts make decisions to engage in collective 
action out of a moral duty to protect ‘sacred’ values embedded in collective identities. Moral 
obligation is related to but distinct from other morality constructs such as moral values, moral 
convictions, and inner obligation. Sabucedo et al. (2018) consider moral obligation as the 
motivation to act according to moral norms and moral convictions. Hence, moral norms and 
convictions are (more distal) beliefs and moral obligation is “the motivation to act according 
to them” (Sabucedo et al., 2018, p.3). Three studies confirmed the distinction between these 
three moral constructs.    
In the context of social movements, Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, and Jorger (2003) 
demonstrated that identification with a social movement (i.e., politicized identification) 
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predicts action intentions through an inner obligation to behave in line with group norms. 
Moreover, inner obligation was unrelated to the reward motive (expected personal gains and 
losses through participation), in line with the idea that this variable represents an actor’s 
intrinsic motivation. Vilas and Sabucedo (2012) tested an integrative model of the role of 
moral obligation in motivating collective action. They demonstrated that student’s anger 
about an alleged rise in tuition fees, identification with the student movement against fees, 
and beliefs in the efficacy of collective action independently predict a sense of moral 
obligation, which emerged as the strongest predictor and mediated the link between these 
variables and action intentions. The recent work by Sabucedo et al. (2018) further indicated 
that moral obligation is the strongest predictor of actual participation. We aim to contribute to 
this emerging field within the collective action literature by providing additional empirical 
evidence for the role of moral obligation, considering it as the most proximal predictor of 
collective action, including novel predictors which have not been included in the above 
mentioned studies (i.e., perceived risks, fear, identity consolidation efficacy, and participative 
efficacy), and looking at this in repressive contexts.   
Collective Action in High-Risk Contexts 
The term risk refers to specific adverse effects that might occur only if one decides to 
engage in a particular behavior (Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984; Luhmann, 1991; Renn, 
1992). Based on McAdam (1986), we define high-risk activism as activism in contexts where 
engagement is associated with severe anticipated dangers, including legal (e.g., being 
arrested), financial (being fined), or physical (being injured or killed) risks. Note that risks 
are conceptually different from costs, which are circumscribed and may refer to the energy, 
time, and financial losses incurred through engagement (Klandermans, 1984). As noted by 
McAdam (1986), low-cost actions such as signing a petition can be high-risk in contexts 
where doing so can have detrimental personal consequences, as it did recently for many 
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Turkish academics who were convicted of terrorism charges after signing a petition to end 
government violence against the Kurds (Acar & Coşkan, 2020; Başer, Akgönül, & Öztürk, 
2017). 
The sociological and political science literatures on social movements and civil 
resistance provide two key insights relevant to the present work. First, a series of studies 
underline the importance of distinguishing the factors underpinning individual involvement in 
high- vs low-risk activism. For example, McAdam (1986) showed that the progression from 
low- to high-risk activism depends to a large extent on the presence of strong social ties to 
other activists, as well as the depth of ideological commitment (see also Nepstad & Smith, 
1999; Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991). Similarly, DiGrazia (2014) reported that those from 
privileged social backgrounds and ideologically moderate are more likely to engage in low-
risk activism and those from disadvantaged social groups and ideologically more extreme are 
more likely to engage in high-risk activism. These findings underline the importance of 
expanding tests of established predictive models to high-risk contexts.  
Second, a large body of work demonstrates that the relationship between repression 
and activism does not necessarily conform to the intuitive assumption that greater risks quell 
resistance. While approaches relying on an economic model of protest behavior (e.g., Olson, 
1965; Hardin, 1982) view risks faced through participation as disincentives that should 
reduce activism (see also Boykoff, 2007), approaches highlighting the importance of 
collective processes suggest that repression is likely to create new grievances (e.g., Gurr, 
1970), increase other incentives attached to engagement (e.g., social, moral and public goods 
incentives; see Opp, 1994, White, 1989), and may thus aid the very processes that enable 
successful mass mobilization, such as consciousness-raising and framing (Hirsch, 1990).  
Empirical research on this topic has mostly conducted macro- and meso-level analyses 
and examined the impact of state repression on the rate of social protest over time and cross-
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nationally, as well as the effects of acts of repression on specific social movements (see Earl, 
2011, for a review). There is some evidence demonstrating deterrence effects at the macro-
level (e.g., Earl & Soule, 2010; Koopmans, 1997), as well as findings showing that repression 
weakens social movement organizations (e.g., Jeffries, 2010). A substantial body of research 
has, however, documented an escalation of protest activity (Francisco, 1995, 2004; Jenkins & 
Schock 2004; Ondetti, 2006; Ortiz, 2007; Rasler, 1996; White, 1989). Consistent evidence 
was also reported at the meso-level, where repression was shown to foster alliances (Chang, 
2008; Chang & Kim, 2007; Loveman, 1998), and to strengthen movements by increasing 
public and international support (DeNardo, 1985; Hess & Martin, 2006).  
Linking these political outcomes with individuals’ responses, Opp and Roehl (1990) 
argue that negative sanctions are likely to indirectly stimulate protest by setting in motion 
processes of “micro-mobilization” (p.523), which increase individuals’ motivation and 
commitment (see also White, 1989). Empirical analyses of such micro-level processes are, 
however, scarce (see Earl, 2011; Honari, 2017). Opp and Roehl (1990) demonstrated that 
expectations of police brutality predicted greater willingness to protest among German anti-
nuclear power protesters by creating a sense of political alienation, which Opp and Roehl 
(1990) define as when the political system is considered with discontent and a critical eye, 
increasing expected approval of protest by close others, and heightening obligation to 
participate (see also Linden & Klandermans, 2007, for qualitative data). Only one study has 
examined the impact of risk from a social-psychological perspective. Ayanian and Tausch 
(2016) provided first evidence that perceived risk (i.e., the perceived likelihood of being 
arrested, injured or killed) was a positive predictor of action intentions in the post-coup 
uprising in Egypt, over and above current involvement. Furthermore, this relation was in part 
mediated by outrage about the treatment of protesters and increased identity consolidation 
efficacy (i.e., the perceived effectiveness of protest in building a social movement). 
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Hypotheses 
The present research aims to further illuminate the psychological processes that 
motivate individuals to protest in repressive, high-risk contexts by testing a predictive model 
derived from the main social-psychological theories of collective action and incorporating 
recent theoretical advancements. Our model considers risk perception as a distal predictor, 
emotional responses to risk (fear and anger), facets of the efficacy of protest (political, 
identity consolidation, and participative efficacy), and politicized identification as mediating 
variables, and moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of future action intentions (see 
Figure 1). To the best of our knowledge, the present predictive model is the first to consider 
these variables simultaneously to assess their unique contributions. 
Based on intergroup emotions theory (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000) and previous work 
(Saab & Ayoub, 2016), we expect that perceived risks due to repression (i.e., expectations 
that engaging in protest results in negative consequences such as arrest or injury) to positively 
predict fear (H1). We also expect a positive link between perceived risks and outrage (H2), 
based on the idea that sanctions imposed by the authorities constitute new grievances (Gurr, 
1970; Hess & Martin, 2006; see also Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). We afford alternative 
hypotheses regarding the relation between perceived risks and efficacy. On the one hand, 
perceived risks might negatively predict political efficacy (H3a), as protesters can perceive 
repression as authorities’ determination and ability to resist their demands (Muller, 1985). 
Similarly, the expectations of such sanctions might reduce perceived identity consolidation 
efficacy (H4a), as severe reprisals against protesters could reduce social action support (van 
Zomeren et al., 2004) and thus reduce the movement’s mobilization potential. By the same 
logic, increased risks attached to protest might also diminish belief in the value of one’s own 
contribution (H5a). Perceived risks may, however, also increase the expected political 
efficacy of protest (H3b). Repression can signal the authorities’ weakness, as they are losing 
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the people’s voluntary compliance (Chenoweth, 2015; Sharp, 2005) and impose international 
pressure on the authorities to concede to protesters’ demands (Dudouet, 2015; Ondetti, 2006; 
Wisler & Giugni, 1999).  
As protest under repressive conditions can arouse sympathy and support from 
bystanders and motivate yet uninvolved people to join in (DeNardo, 1985), one might also 
expect a positive relation between risk and identity consolidation efficacy (H4b; see Ayanian 
& Tausch 2016, for initial evidence). This mobilizing effect forms part of the strategy of 
many radical movements, which are often successful in engendering wider support for their 
goals due to excessive countermeasures by the state (see Kydd & Walter, 2006). The belief in 
the added value of one’s own contribution (participative efficacy) might also be positively 
predicted by imposed risks (H5b), as repression reduces the ability to ‘free ride’ and is likely 
to highlight the importance to demonstrate strength (Lukyanova, 2016; Smyth, Soboleva, 
Shimek, & Sobolev, 2013). We further hypothesize perceived risks to increase politicized 
identification (H6) based on the idea that illegitimate group-based disadvantages, such as 
perceived risks due to authority repression, create perceptions of common fate, which lead 
activists to feel closer to other protesters, increase their belonging and psychological 
investment in the group, and prioritize their group’s interests (Della Porta, 1992; Drury & 
Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996).  
Based on previous research, we expect the core predictors of collective action to feed 
into a sense of moral obligation. First, we hypothesize a positive relation between politicized 
identification and moral obligation (H7), in line with the idea that identification with a social 
movement creates an experienced duty to conform to group norms and protect ingroup values 
(Atran & Ginges, 2015; Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). Moreover, the belief 
that one’s personal actions can make a contribution (see Stern et al., 1999), and that protests 
serve to build and solidify the movement, should be associated with a heightened sense of 
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obligation (H8 and H9, respectively). We propose alternative hypotheses regarding the 
relation between political efficacy and moral obligation. One the one hand, the belief that the 
action will be successful in achieving its goals might create a greater imperative to join in 
(H10a; see Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). On the other hand, high perceived political efficacy 
might compel individuals to “free-ride” (Olson, 1968) as there is less of a perceived need to 
contribute (H10b).  
Based on previous findings indicating that a sense of obligation rises as a function of 
perceived severity of an offense (Stern et al., 1999; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012), we hypothesize 
a positive link between outrage and moral obligation (H11). We have no expectations 
regarding the link between fear and moral obligation, but propose that fear will be a direct 
negative predictor of collective action intentions (H12), in line with the established 
association of fear with cautious and risk-averse behavior (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; 
Smith & Kirby 2001), as well as with previous work which demonstrated fear’s predictive 
role in withdrawal behavior (Dumont, et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2009; Saab & Ayoub, 2016). 
Finally, we expect moral obligation to be a positive predictor of action intentions (H13; see 
Stern et al., 1999; Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012; Vilas et al., 2018). As 
previous research has reported mixed findings regarding the role of moral obligation as a full 
or partial mediator (see Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012; Sabucedo et al., 2018), 
we allow residual paths from all predictors to collective action intentions in our model.  
We tested our predictions in four political contexts where collective action was 
repressed by the authorities: protests demanding political reform in Russia (Study 1), the 
Ukrainian protests against the separation of the South-Eastern regions (Study 2), protests that 
took place as part of the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong (Study 3), and the protests 
against urban regeneration projects in Turkey (Study 4). The findings of these studies are 
then summarized meta-analytically. In each study we used participants’ own willingness to 
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engage in collective action as our main dependent measure. Previous research has shown that 
behavioral intentions can be a useful proxy for actual behavior (Webb & Sheeran, 2006) and 
that collective action intentions are good predictors of actual participation (e.g., de Weerd & 
Klandermans, 1999; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009).  
Furthermore, in each study, we focus primarily on individuals who were already or 
who are likely to be involved in the protest movements under investigation, but with varying 
degrees of engagement, since we were particularly interested in examining how risks shape 
one’s motivation to engage in collective action pertinent to them. Our choice was based on 
our acknowledgment that within the general population, individuals might respond differently 
to the grievances raised during protests and to the state repression, as some would strongly 
disagree with the protests’ demands and even applaud state repression. We include past 
participation as a control variable for all hypothesized associations. Thus, the impact of risks 
represent shifts in action intentions (over and above previous levels of involvement), as a 
function of emotions in response to repression, efficacy beliefs, identity, and moral 
obligation. Hence, this inclusion controls for potential differences between participants with 
different levels of involvement and investment in protests (e.g., heavily involved activists, 
recently engaged activists, occasional protesters), and excludes the potential differences 
between occasional and heavily involved activists due to their rating the constructs 
differentially.    
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Figure 1: Summary of hypotheses  
Study 1: Russia 
Russia witnessed a wave of protests in response to the 2011-2012 legislative and 
presidential elections, which were perceived by many as illegitimate and fraudulent (Gel'man, 
2015; Ross, 2015). Initially of a small scale, the protests escalated into massive 
demonstrations in Moscow and across the country. The protesters demanded political and 
economic reforms; they called for political prisoners to be freed, political freedoms to be 
respected and broadened (e.g., allowing the registration of opposition parties), and corruption 
to end. These protests were met with substantial repression. The authorities arrested hundreds 
of protesters and imprisoned some of the main protest leaders (Greene, 2014). In June 2012, 
new laws were implemented to impose heavy penalties for any collective action that is not 
sanctioned by the authorities. Specifically, a new law determined that anyone who tries to 
threaten the integrity of Russia, even if such threats are made solely in online forums, can be 
imprisoned for up to five years (Demirjian, 2014). Furthermore, several websites were 
censored and even blocked for documenting the authorities’ breaches of human rights 
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(Greene, 2014) and several opposition leaders were harassed and NGOs involved in the 
actions were scrutinized (International Federation for Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination 
Centre, 2014; Lyytikainen, 2013). In the time period during which we conducted the survey 
(early May 2014), Russian activists were attempting to organize the annual May 6 protests in 
support of the goals of the 2011-2012 movement.    
Method 
Procedure and Respondents 
 We received the ethical approval for this study (and the three subsequent ones) from 
the school research ethics committee at the University of St Andrews. We launched the 
survey on May 2nd 2014, four days prior the planned May 6 protests. The link to the online 
survey was sent to a group of activists who had participated in a previous interview study on 
political activism conducted by one of the authors, and posted on one of the pro-oppositional 
radio station’s website called Echo of Moscow. A total of 433 participants entered the survey. 
We deleted the data of 125 participants who either left the survey immediately before 
completing any measures, completed the demographics items only, filled in measures for just 
one or two of the focal constructs, or had scattered data points but left 90% of the survey 
empty. We also deleted three multivariate outliers identified through Casewise diagnostic 
(standardized residuals > ±2.5), leaving a final sample of 305 participants (153 women, 151 
men, one refused to answer; Mage = 37.60, SD = 11.74). Most participants (46.7%) were from 
Moscow, and nearly all (93.3%) had completed higher education. The majority of 
participants had some level of past participation in collective action; 2% were protest 
organizers, 9.5% were regular protesters, 43.3% were occasional protesters, and 21.3% were 
active on social networks.  
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Measures  
Two bilingual students translated and back-translated the survey into Russian. 
Participants completed measures of the main variables, demographics, and series of questions 
about the political situation in Russia, which are not part of this analysis. The full list of 
analyzed items for all four studies can be found in the Supplementary Material.    
Likelihood of risk. Participants indicated the perceived risks of protesting using 
seven items on five-point scales ranging from very unlikely (1) to very likely (5) (i.e., "risking 
employment or university degree", "being harassed by the police", "a family member being 
harassed by the police (losing privileges, e.g., jobs)", "being arrested", "being imprisoned, 
detained", "being tortured", "being killed", α = .92, adapted from Ayanian & Tausch, 2016, 
and Opp, 1994).  
Politicized identification. Participants rated five items on five-point scales ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (e.g., "I feel I belong to the protest 
Movement in Russia", "being part of the protest movement in Russia is an important part of 
who I am", α = .92; adapted from Cameron, 2004).  
Efficacy beliefs. We adapted Saab et al.’s (2015) scale to assess political and identity 
consolidation efficacies by asking participants how likely it was for the protests to realize a 
range of goals (1 = very unlikely to 5 = very likely). Our political efficacy1 scale included 
ratings of nine goals relating to the explicit goals of the protest (e.g., "end of corruption in 
Russia", "registration of oppositional parties", "defense of human rights", α = .93). To assess 
identity consolidation efficacy we asked respondents to rate three goals (i.e., "increase public 
                                                             
1 Across the four studies, the items for political efficacy were adapted to each context to 
reflect the explicit goals of each movement based on consultations with the collaborators who 
were experts on the protest movement in their respective context.   
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support for the protests in Russia", "strengthen the solidarity among the protesters", "ensure 
international support for the protests in Russia", α = .77).   
Participative efficacy. We used two items adapted from van Zomeren et al. (2013) to 
measure participative efficacy (e.g., "I believe that I, as an individual, can contribute greatly 
so that members of the opposition movement in Russia, as a group, can achieve their goals", r 
= .76, p < .001) on scales ranging from (1) = strongly disagree to (5) = strongly agree.  
Outrage. On a five-point scale ranging from not at all (1) to a great extent (5), 
participants rated the extent they feel outraged (i.e., "When thinking about the treatment of 
protesters in Russia (e.g. arrestment, use of force, use of tear gas and pepper spray, etc…), to 
what extent do you feel outraged?"). 
Fear. On a five-point scale ranging from not at all (1) to a great extent (5), 
participants rated the extent to which they feel fearful (i.e., "When thinking about protesting 
against the government, please indicate the extent to which you feel the following emotions 
when you engage in non-violent sanctioned collective action2 (i.e., peaceful protests, peaceful 
demonstrations, peaceful sit ins, etc.). 
 Moral obligation. Participants rated how obliged they felt to participate in collective 
action by rating four items on five-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) (e.g., "I feel morally obliged to participate in anti-government protests", "I 
                                                             
2 We decided to consider peaceful sanctioned collective action, referring to actions (e.g., 
demonstrations, protests, etc.) that have received prior approval from the authorities, as the 
May 6 protests were expected to be sanctioned. Moreover, the majority of activists in Russia 
engage in such collective action, and, although officially sanctioned, these actions were still 
repressed by the authorities (see Barry & Schwirtz, 2012; Krasavina, 2017).  
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feel a strong sense of responsibility to participate in the anti-government protests", α = .95; 
adapted from Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). 
Action intentions. Participants rated their likelihood to engage in sanctioned peaceful 
collective action using a single item on a five-point scale ranging from definitely will not take 
part (1) to I will definitely take part (5) (e.g., "Please tell us how likely it is that you would 
engage in sanctioned, non-violent protest actions (e.g., protesting, demonstrating, being 
active on social networks) in the very near future")3. 
Control variables.  Participants’ level of involvement in past protests, assessed on a 
single five-point scale ranging from never (1) to frequently (5), as well as their age (in years) 
were included as control variables in the path model.  
Results and Discussion  
Preliminary analyses and general analytical strategy. We employed path analysis in 
M-Plus (Version 5.2; Muthén & Muthén, 1998, 2007) to assess the significance of the 
proposed relations and evaluate the significance of indirect paths in one step. Demographic 
variables were included as controls when they correlated with the model variables to avoid 
spurious relationships. Prior to the analyses we first inspected our data with respect to 
missing values and normality. Due to missing data on a number of variables (see details 
below) as well as diversions from normality for some variables, we decided to use 
bootstrapping for our path analyses in all studies and used bootstrap standard errors and bias-
                                                             
3 We conducted factor analyses for a three-factor versus a one-factor model to test whether 
politicized identification, moral obligation and collective action are in fact three distinct 
constructs. Across the four studies, our results confirmed that the three factor solution 
provided a significantly better fit than the alternative one-factor model.  
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corrected confidence intervals based on 5,000 resamples for all parameter estimates (Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1993; Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  
Means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations between the model variables for 
the present study are presented in Table 1. Participant age correlated significantly with 
several model variables and was thus included as a control. In Table 2 we present the means 
and standard deviations for responses to each individual item related to perceived risks. The 
table suggests that participants perceived these risks as relevant, since except for the items of 
being tortured and killed, participants scored significantly higher than the midpoint. 
Note that age (7.5%), fear (39.7%), moral obligation (22.3%), and willingness to 
engage in collective action (18%) had notable proportions of missing values. The amount of 
missing data for other variables was negligible (<5%). Little’s (1988) global test, which 
determines whether missing values depend on other model variables, was non-significant (χ2 
(1050) = 1119.094, p = .068), suggesting that the overall missing data pattern can be 
considered missing-completely-at-random (MCAR; Little & Rubin, 2002). Nonetheless, 
further inspection indicated that past involvement in protest negatively correlated with 
missingness for fear (r = - .55, p <.01), suggesting that those who were less highly involved 
in protests had difficulty answering some of the questions related directly to activism (e.g., 
how fearful would they be while protesting). Thus, we considered the missing data as 
missing-at-random (MAR4; see Rubin, 1976) and employed full information maximum-
                                                             
4 Missing completely at random (MCAR) is when the missing points do not depend on 
observed nor unobserved data (Little & Rubin, 2002). Missing at random (MAR) is when the 
missingness depends on observed data but not unobserved data. Hence, it refers to missing 
value patterns where there are systematic relationships between the missing values and the 
data included in the analyses (Graham, 2009; Little & Rubin, 2002). Missing not at random 
    
 
23 
 
likelihood estimation (FIML; Enders, 2001) in the analyses. This method uses all available 
information to provide a maximum likelihood estimate for missing values and thus adjusts for 
likely mechanisms of missingness and includes in the model variation accounting for the 
missing values. FIML was shown to produce the least biased results compared to traditional 
methods of handling missing data such as listwise deletion or mean imputation (Acock, 2005, 
Schafer & Graham, 2002). Although we note few differences in results between this method 
and listwise deletion5, results from listwise deletion should be approached with caution. As 
listwise deletion yields conservative results and loss of power, it inflates the standard errors 
and reduces the significance when MCAR is met, and it yields biased estimates when MAR is 
met (Buhi, Goodson, & Neilands, 2008; Enders, 2001). 
                                                             
(MNAR) is when the missingness depends on unobserved variables rather than variables 
included in the analyses.   
5 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values yielded a reduced sample of N = 137. While 
the overall pattern of results was very similar, several of the paths did not reach conventional 
levels of significance. Specifically, perceived risks did not predict participative efficacy (B = 
-.03, SE = .11, p = .979, [-.221, .215]), and outrage did not predict moral obligation (B = .07, 
SE = .05, p = .156, [-.029, .177]). The direct paths from outrage (B = .08, SE = .06, p = .138, 
[-.028, .197]) and participative efficacy (B = .00, SE = .08, p = .985, [-.158, .161]) to 
collective action were also not significant. The indirect paths from perceived risks to 
collective action via outrage and participative efficacy were not significant (.03, SE = .03, p 
= .200, [-.000, .097]; .00, SE = .01, p = .999, [-.018, .017]). The indirect (.13, SE = .08, p 
= .213, [-.020, .302]) and total (-.04, SE = .09, p = .654, [-.022, .139]) paths from perceived 
risks to collective action were also not significant.  
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-order Correlations (Study 1)   
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Likelihood of Risk 3.39 .91 1.000           
2. Outrage 3.33 1.36 .36** 1.000          
3. Fear 2.16 .98 .36** .14 1.000         
4. Political Efficacy 2.60 .79 -.16* .05 -.09 1.000        
5. Identity Consolidation 
Efficacy  3.40 .83 .13* .24** .06 .40** 1.000       
6. Participative Efficacy 2.77 1.07 .17** .27** .04 .35** .39** 1.000      
7. Politicized Identification 3.10 .99 .41** .46** .14 .12* .39** .58** 1.000     
8. Moral Obligation 3.31 1.19 .34** .43** -.02 .03 .23** .54** .73** 1.000    
9. Future Collective Action 3.25 1.17 .19** .42** -.20** .14** .32** .54** .68** .73** 1.000   
10. Past Involvement  2.38 1.17 .14* .31** .01 .16** .20** .45** .52** .62** .65** 1.000  
11. Age 37.60 11.74 .09 .19** -.16* .05 .02 .14* .29** .28** .22** .17** 1.000 
 
 
  
    
 
25 
 
Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations for Perceived Risks (Study 1) 
Perceived Risks  M (SD) 
Risking employment/or university degree 3.56 (1.07) 
Being harassed by the police 3.94 (.95) 
Having a family member being harassed by the police (losing 
privileges, e.g. jobs…) 
3.20 (1.12) 
Being Imprisoned, detained etc. 3.86 (1.02) 
Being Arrested 3.60 (1.11) 
Being tortured 2.96 (1.22) 
Being killed 2.65 (1.19) 
Note: The items were rated on five-point scales ranging from very unlikely (1) to very likely 
(5) 
 
Path analysis. The results of our path analysis are summarized in Figure 2 (see Table 
S1 in the Supplementary Material for detailed reports of all direct, indirect and total effects). 
As predicted, perceived risks positively predicted fear (H1; B = .36, SE = .05, p < .001, 
[.273, .462]), outrage (H2; B = .48, SE = .08, p < .001, [.329, .642]), participative efficacy 
(H5b; B = .14, SE = .06, p = .020, [.016, .253]), and politicized identification (H6; B = .34, 
SE = .05, p < .001, [.238, .435]). Contrary to hypothesis H4, perceived risks did not predict 
identity consolidation efficacy (B = .10, SE = .06, p = .088, [-.016, .217]). Confirming 
hypothesis H3a and in line with the idea that increased sanctions reduce the belief that 
protest’s demands will be met (Muller, 1985), perceived risks negatively predicted political 
efficacy (B = -.17, SE = .05, p = .002, [-.272, -.064]). There was also a significant direct link 
between perceived risks and moral obligation to participate (B = .09, SE =.04, p = .028, 
[.010, .176]). 
As expected, politicized identification (H7, B = .50, SE = .06, p < .001, [.367, .623]), 
participative efficacy (H8, B = .21, SE =.05, p < .001, [.110, .319]) and outrage (H11, B = .11, 
SE = .03, p < .001, [.053, .182]) positively predicted moral obligation. Contrary to H9, 
identity consolidation efficacy (B = -.03, SE = .05, p = .579, [-.129, .078]) did not predict 
moral obligation. Interestingly and consistent with hypothesis H10b, political efficacy (B = 
-.13, SE = .05, p = .007, [-.236, -.038]) negatively predicted moral obligation and had an 
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indirect negative path to collective action through moral obligation (-.04, SE = .02, p = .031, 
[-.091, -.011]). This is consistent with the “free rider effect” (Olson, 1968); thus, the more 
likely individuals felt that the protest movement will achieve its goals, the less they felt an 
obligation to take action.    
Consistent with H12, fear (B = -.24, SE = .05, p < .001, [-.338, -.123]) negatively 
predicted action intentions. There were also direct paths from outrage (B = .11, SE = .03, p 
< .001, [.056, .182]), identity consolidation efficacy (B = .12, SE = .05, p = .013, 
[.021, .203]), participative efficacy (B = .10, SE = .05, p = .031, [.011, .200]), and politicized 
identification (B = .30, SE = .07, p < .001, [.161, .441]) to action intentions. Finally, and 
consistent with H13, moral obligation (B = .31, SE = .07, p < .001, [.184, .447]) positively 
predicted collective action intentions. The model explained a sizeable 70% of the variance in 
collective action intentions.  
Analyses of the indirect effects indicated that while perceived risks negatively 
predicted action intentions through fear (-.09, SE = .02, p = .001, [-.142, -.043]), in line with a 
deterrent effect, there were positive indirect effects via outrage (.06, SE = .02, p = .003, 
[.025, .100]), participative efficacy (.01, SE = .01, p = .141, [.001, .043]), politicized 
identification (.10, SE = .03, p < .001, [.054, .163]), and moral obligation (.03, SE = .01, p 
= .048, [.005, .064]). Notably, the total effect from perceived risks to collective action was 
positive and significant (.13, SE = .06, p = .023, [.020, .250]), confirming the idea that 
sanctions related to activism can galvanize people to engage in further action (Opp & Roehl, 
1990; White, 1989). 
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Figure 2: Results of path analysis in the Russian sample (Study 2, N = 308). The dashed 
arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the standardized regression 
estimates. *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Past involvement in protests and age were 
considered as covariates. Past involvement positively predicted outrage (β = .24), political 
efficacy (β = .19**), identity consolidation efficacy (β = .19**), participative efficacy (β 
= .42***), politicized identification (β = .47***), moral obligation (β = .28***), and 
collective action (β = .20***). Past participation negatively predicted fear (β = -.16**). Age 
positively predicted outrage (β = .12*) and politicized identification (β = .17**), and 
negatively predicted fear (β = -.21***). 
 
Overall, these findings confirm the importance of politicized identification, emotions, 
and efficacy beliefs in predicting collective action intentions in a high-risk context. 
Identification with the protest movement emerged as the strongest predictor and, in line with 
prior research (Stürmer et al., 2003), its effect was partially mediated by obligation to 
participate. The significance of this variable also mirrors qualitative findings based on 
interviews with Russian activists (Lukyanova, 2016; Smyth, Soboleva, Shimek, & Sobolev, 
2013a, 2013b), which highlighted psychological investment in the movement and emotional 
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ties with fellow activists as key motivators for participation. Consistent with predictions 
based on intergroup emotions theory and previous research (Dumont et al., 2003; Miller et 
al., 2009; Saab & Ayoub, 2016), fear experienced in relation to repression of protest 
negatively predicted collective action intentions, while outrage about the treatment of 
protesters positively predicted action intentions (as in Ayanian & Tausch, 2016), both directly 
and indirectly via moral obligation.  
The predictive roles of the different types of efficacy were more complex. There was 
a small predictive effect of identity consolidation efficacy, suggesting that the perceived 
ability of a protest in mobilizing a movement contributes to people’s decisions to get 
involved. This replicates Ayanian and Tausch’s (2016) findings from a study of the Egyptian 
uprising and supplements qualitative interview data in the context of current Russian anti-
government activism in which activists stressed the importance of the protests in reaching the 
wider population and establishing alliances with other organizations (Lukyanova, 2016; 
Smyth et al., 2013a, 2013b). Furthermore, the novel construct of participative efficacy (van 
Zomeren et al., 2013) uniquely predicted action intentions, both directly and indirectly via 
moral obligation. Thus, the extent to which potential protesters believe in the importance of 
their personal contribution, the more obliged they feel to participate, and the more willing 
they are to get involved, over and above the ‘traditional’ predictors of engagement.  
Finally, an intriguing finding emerged with regard to the predictive role of political 
efficacy, which had a negative indirect effect on action intentions via moral obligation. 
Instrumental accounts of collective action generally assume, and copious evidence confirms 
(e.g., Mummendey et al. 1999; Saab et al, 2015; see van Zomeren et al., 2008, for meta-
analytic evidence), that political efficacy is a major motivator for individual participation. 
Several recent studies have, however, reported negative relations between political efficacy 
and action intentions (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 
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2013). A number of explanations for this effect have been proffered. Some authors (Saab, 
Spears, Tausch, & Sasse, 2016; Tausch et al., 2011) suggested that (in particular radical) 
collective action can sometimes represent a ‘nothing-to-lose’ strategy aimed to unsettle a 
system that is currently unresponsive to attempts for social change. Alternatively, however, 
one can also argue that that the negative relationship might represent individuals’ tendency to 
‘free ride’ when there is an effective movement (Olson, 1968; see also van Zomeren et al., 
2013). The inclusion of moral obligation as a proximal predictor of action in the present study 
allowed us to shed some light on this issue. Our findings suggest that, over and above the 
other predictors, a greater belief in the political effectiveness of protests might reduce 
personal pressure to get involved.  
Our findings regarding the role of perceived risks as a predictor of intended future 
engagement give a number of insights into the micro-level processes that may be involved in 
the effects of repression on protest. As expected and in line with a deterrent effect, perceived 
risks predicted fear in relation to protesting, which in turn negatively predicted future action 
intentions. However, expected sanctions also positively predicted outrage, politicized 
identification, and participative efficacy, each of which were positive predictors of action 
intentions, directly as well as indirectly via a sense of moral obligation. There was a 
significant positive total effect of perceived risks, consistent with the idea that repression can 
galvanize protest behavior (Opp & Roehl, 1999).  
Study 2: Ukraine 
The second context we examined was Ukraine. The country witnessed profound 
social-political changes in 2014, including the Euromaidan protests and Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea earlier that year to the election of the pro-EU President Petro Poroshenko, who 
came to power with 54 percent of the electoral vote, promising to introduce radical reforms 
and end the war with the separatists. Although the Euromaidan social movement was still 
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salient, its focus had shifted from promoting EU integration to securing Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity under the threat of Russia’s military invasion (see Bebler, 2015, for an overview of 
events). Specifically, the Ukraine protests were against the new government’s “peace plan”, 
which included giving special status and greater autonomy to separatist-held areas of the East 
(United Nations, 2014). 
We targeted the protests within the context of Ukraine’s return to compulsory military 
conscription (e.g., Balmforth, 2014) and at the time when, according to NATO reports, the 
country had reached an intense phase of a military conflict with Russia-backed separatists in 
the Eastern Provinces (e.g., Demirjian & Birnbaum, 2014; Gordon, 2014). 
Method 
Procedure and Respondents 
We launched the online survey in August 2014. The link to the survey was 
disseminated through sending mass emails to personal contacts, contacting a local NGO in 
the southeast region of Ukraine, and posting on several Facebook pages on which the events 
in the South East of Ukraine were discussed. A total of 192 participants entered the survey. 
We deleted the data of 56 participants who either left the survey immediately before 
completing any measures, completed just the demographic items, filled in some measures but 
none of our focal variables, or completed measures for just one of the focal constructs. The 
final sample was formed of 136 participants (77 women, 59 men; Mage = 32.06, SD = 9.12). 
Most participants (89.7%) were of Ukrainian ethnic background, the majority (38.6%) was 
living in Kyiv, and most (87 %) had completed higher education. The majority of participants 
had some level of past participation in collective action; 5.9% were protest organizers, 25% 
were regular protesters, 33.1% were occasional protesters, and 22.1% were active on social 
networks. 
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Measures  
Two native speaker researchers translated the survey to Ukrainian and attended to any 
discrepancies. We measured past involvement in protests, likelihood of risks (8 items, α 
= .91), outrage, fear, political efficacy (8 goals, e.g., "end corruption and nepotism in 
Ukraine", "achieve democratization in Ukraine", "defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine", 
α = .90), identity consolidation efficacy (3 goals, α = .78), participative efficacy (r = .89, p 
< .001), politicized identification (α = .94), moral obligation (α = .96), and demographics 
using the same measures (adapted to the Ukrainian context) as in Study 1. The survey also 
contained a number of additional items related to the political situation, but these were not the 
focus of the current analysis. 
Future collective action. Participants rated their willingness to engage in nonviolent 
protest actions on a five-point scale ranging from not at all willing (1) to extremely willing (5) 
(e.g., "if the situation in Ukraine does not improve, please tell us how willing you would be to 
engage in nonviolent protest actions (i.e., protesting, demostrating, being active on social 
networks) in the very near future"). 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis. Means, standard deviations and correlations between variables 
are shown in Table 3 and means and standard deviations for responses to each individual item 
measuring perceived risks are shown in Table 4. Again, the values suggest that these risks 
were relevant to participants, as most values were around the midpoint and the values of 
being harassed or blackmailed items were significantly higher than the midpoint. There were 
missing values for perceived risks (9.6%), fear (10%), participative efficacy (5.9%), moral 
obligation (13.2%), and collective action (19.1%). Little’s (1988) global test was marginally 
non-significant (χ2 (591) = 643.632, p = .066). Similar to Study 1, further inspection showed 
past involvement to positively correlate with missingness for fear (r = -.179, p < .05) and 
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collective action (r = - .268, p <.01). Hence, we considered the missing data as missing-at-
random (MAR) and employed FIML to address this issue. We note very similar pattern in 
results between this method and listwise deletion6.
                                                             
6 The sample size decreased to N = 112 when the listwise deletion of cases with missing 
values was used. The overall pattern was very similar, except that participative efficacy did 
not predict moral obligation (B = .15, SE = .10, p = .122, [-.041, .340]) and had no significant 
indirect path to collective action through moral obligation (.04, SE = .04, p = .187, 
[-.006, .150]). 
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Table 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-order Correlations (Study 2)  
 Means SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Likelihood of Risk 3.12 .83 1.000          
2. Outrage 3.75 1.10 .09 1.000         
3. Fear 2.03 .90 .43** -.03 1.000        
4. Political Efficacy 3.38 .86 -.03 .20* -.03 1.000       
5. Identity Consolidation Efficacy  3.79 .77 -.02 .20* -.01 .54** 1.000      
6. Participative Efficacy 3.54 .98 -.05 .32** -.08 .50** .45** 1.000     
7. Politicized Identification 3.76 .90 -.01 .34** .07 .49** .51** .62** 1.000    
8. Moral Obligation 3.76 1.09 -.01 .34** -.06 .49** .45** .61** .75** 1.000   
9. Future Collective Action 3.94 .95 .01 .21* .10 .33** .47** .50** .66** .62** 1.000  
10. Past Involvement  2.78 1.22 .03 .22* .00 .23** .33** .46** .54** .56** .43** 1.000 
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 Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations for Perceived Risks (Study 2) 
Perceived Risks  M (SD) 
Risking employment/or university degree 2.95 (1.03) 
Being harassed by the opponent parties’ representatives 3.78 (.95) 
Having a family member being harassed by the opponent parties' 
representatives 
3.37 (1.09) 
“Blackmailing" by state controlling units (such as tax inspectorate of 
personal businesses) 
3.51 (.99) 
Being imprisoned (or detained) 3.17 (1.05) 
Being arrested 2.95 (1.16) 
Being tortured  2.71 (1.19) 
Being killed 2.46 (1.18) 
Note: The items were rated on five-point scales ranging from very unlikely (1) to very likely 
(5) 
 
Path analysis. Figure 3 presents results from our path analysis (see Table S3 in the 
Supplementary Material for a detailed report). Confirming H1, perceived risks predicted fear 
(B = .46, SE = .10, p < .001, [.268, .653]). Contrary to the hypotheses, perceived risks did not 
predict any of the remaining variables: outrage (H2; B = .07, SE = .13, p = .565, 
[-.179, .313]), political efficacy (H3a/b; B = -.04, SE = .10, p = .719, [-.234, .151]), identity 
consolidation efficacy (H4a/b; B = -.03, SE = .07,  p = .638, [-.173, .105]), participative 
efficacy (H5a/b; B = -.08, SE = .09, p = .358, [-.265, .102]), politicized identification (H6; B 
= -.02, SE = .09, p = .827, [-.196, .153]). 
In line with hypotheses H7 and H8, politicized identification (B = .55, SE = .11, p 
< .001, [.309, .759]) and participative efficacy (B = .18, SE = .09, p = .037, [.002, .351]) 
positively predicted moral obligation, but identity consolidation efficacy, political efficacy, 
and outrage did not (H9, B = .02, SE = .09, p = .840, [-.166, .184], H10, B = .14, SE = .09, p 
= .116, [-.031, .315]), and H11, B = .06, SE = .06, p = .300, [-.054, .172]) respectively).  
Consistent with Study 1, politicized identification (B = .30, SE = .13, p = .027, 
[.018, .543]) and moral obligation (H13, B = .28, SE = .13, p = .031, [.045, .538]) positively 
predicted action intentions. Contrary to H12, fear (B = .07, SE = .08, p = .370, [-.086, .220]) 
did not predict action intentions. Outrage (B = .01, SE = .07, p = .848, [-.112, .152]), political 
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efficacy (B = -.06, SE = .10, p = .548, [-.271, .132]), identity consolidation efficacy (B = .14, 
SE =.11, p = .213, [-.080, .364]), and participative efficacy (B = .11, SE = .09, p = .232, 
[-.068, .290]) were also not significant predictors. The model explained 46% of the variance 
in collective action intentions. 
Unlike in Study 1, there was no significant indirect path from perceived risks to 
collective action (.00, SE = .07, p = .967, [-.124, .154]). The total path from perceived risks to 
collective action was also non-significant (-.10, SE = .08, p = .246, [-.257, .070]).  
 
Figure 3: Results of path analysis in the Ukrainian sample (Study 3, N = 136). The dashed 
arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the standardized regression 
estimates. *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Past involvement in protests was considered as 
covariate. It positively predicted outrage (β = .23**), political efficacy (β = .23**), identity 
consolidation efficacy (β = .32**), participative efficacy (β = .48***), politicized 
identification (β = .55***), and moral obligation (β = .20**).  
 
 
As in Study 1 and in line with previous research (Stürmer et al., 2003), the present 
results confirmed the importance of politicized identification and moral obligation as the 
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preeminent predictors of future action intentions. However, emotions and efficacy beliefs did 
not have any predictive roles in this particular context. Concerning the role of perceived risks 
as a distal predictor of action intentions, results only confirmed the inhibitory role of 
perceived risks through increasing feelings of fear experienced due to repression of protest, as 
all other paths from perceived risks to collective action antecedents and action intentions 
were not significant. Finally, only politicized identification and participative efficacy 
positively predicted moral obligation. Their paths to action intentions were partially mediated 
by moral obligation, partly affirming the importance of moral obligation as a proximal 
predictor of action intentions.  
The results from Ukraine differed from the previous study, as most of the hypotheses 
relating to perceived risks were not supported. Moreover, most constructs did not predict 
moral obligation, and the model explained a lower percentage of variance in collective action. 
These results might be due to the period during which the survey was conducted. We 
launched the survey when several protests were organized to voice disapproval of the Russian 
separatists and the Ukrainian government’s handling of the military operation in the southeast 
of Ukraine (Gordon, 2014). Since Ukraine was at the edge of war with Russia, it is possible 
that the risks associated with these protests might have been less relevant to our respondents 
compared to the risks and costs of war.  
In sum, results from Study 2, consistent with Study 1, confirmed political efficacy to 
be a trivial motivator and politicized identification and moral obligation to be the prime 
motivators of collective action intentions in high-risk context. These consistent findings 
suggest that in such contexts, protesters’ drive to resist despite the considerable risks they 
face is not the potential political or social benefits but their identification with the resistance 
movement and sense of duty to take action.  
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Study 3: Hong Kong 
Since 1997, Hong Kong has been a Special Administrative Region of China. 
Although China aknowledged the autonomy of Hong Kong according to the initial agreement 
between the two countries, China has recurrently overruled this agreement (BBC news, 2015; 
McKirdy, 2014; Ortman, 2015; Tweed, 2016). One aspect of the Chinese government’s 
interference relates to the Hong Kong electoral laws. In 2007, the Chinese government 
promised Hong Kong to allow its citizens to directly elect their Chief Executive officer in 
2017 and their legislators by 2020. However, in 2012, the new laws of legistlative elections 
disregarded these promises and maintained the old electoral system (see Chan, 2014, for a 
review of the electoral system). Consequently, three professors at the University of Hong 
Kong inititated the Occupy Central with Love and Peace movement, which promoted civil 
disobedience to advocate for the democratization of electoral procedures (Chan, 2014; 
Ortmann, 2015). At the end of August 2014, following the announcement that the electoral 
system for the 2017 elections would remain unchanged, a number of student organizations 
began boycotting classes, and Occupy Central organized protests and staged sit-ins to voice 
their disapproval of this decision and call for electoral reform (Chan, 2014; Ortman, 2015). 
Along with their main demand of open and popular voting for Hong Kong’s chief executive 
in 2017, protesters called for the chief executive officer to step down and democracy in 
general to be respected (Chan, 2014). Throughout the protesting period, the police vastly and 
indiscriminately used teargas, pepper spray, batons, and physical force to clear the protest 
sites, and the government responded with increases in censorship, court orders, and arrests 
(Barber, 2014; Branigan, 2014; Lague, Torode, & Pmfret, 2014; Tsui, 2015). In response to 
the police actions, the protesters used umbrellas as a form of defense and the movement was 
therefore coined as the Umbrella Movement (Henley, 2014). The protests and sit-ins lasted 
until December, when a gradual clearing of the protest sites started.   
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Method 
Procedure and Respondents 
The online survey began in November 2014, while the protests were still ongoing. 
The link to the survey was posted on several Facebook pages promoting the Umbrella 
Movement, tweeted, and emailed to personal contacts in Hong Kong (e.g., friends, 
academics, and activists). A total of 166 participants entered the survey. We deleted the data 
of 55 participants who either immediately left the survey after reading the informed consent, 
answered only the demographics information and some preliminary items, or filled in two of 
the focal constructs, which left a sample of 115 participants (52 women, 60 men, 3 preferred 
not to answer; Mage = 29.37, SD = 9.41). Most participants were from Hong Kong (86.7%) 
and of Chinese ethnic background (77.4%) and most (51.4%) had an undergraduate degree 
(31.4 % had higher education). The majority of the participants had some level of past 
participation in collective action; 19.3% were regular protesters, 52.3% were occasional 
protesters, and 15.6% were active on social networks.  
Measures  
The survey was translated to Chinese by one of the authors, who is a native speaker.  
We measured past involvement in protests, likelihood of risk (8 items, α = .91), emotions 
(i.e., outrage, fear), political efficacy (2 goals, i.e., "protect democracy in Hong Kong" and 
"respect the freedom of speech and other democratic freedoms", r = .84, p < .001), identity 
consolidation efficacy (2 goals, i.e., "strengthen the solidarity among the protesters", "helping 
in building a mass movement in Hong Kong for democratic freedoms in Hong Kong", r 
= .69, p < .001), participative efficacy (r = .85, p < .001), politicized identification (α = .95), 
moral obligation (α = .95), future collective action, and demographics using the same 
measures (adapted to the Hong Kong context) as in Studies 1 and 2. Although additional 
    
 
39 
 
items related to the political context were included, these were not part of the present 
analysis.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. Means, standard deviations and correlations between the 
model variables are presented in Table 5 and means and standard deviations for responses to 
each individual item related to perceived risks are shown in Table 6. Participants scored 
significantly higher than the midpoint on all items, suggesting that being victims of these 
risks was perceived to be highly possible. Only past participation (7%), moral obligation 
(10.4%), and collective action (9.6%) had missing values of more than 5%. Little’s (1988) 
global test was not significant, indicating that the overall missing data pattern is completely at 
random (MCAR, χ2 (442) = 462.574, p = .241). As in Study 1 and 2, we used FIML to 
address the missing values issue and we noted small differences between this method and 
listwise deletion7.  
Path analysis. We summarize the results in Figure 4 and report the detailed analysis 
in Table S5 in the Supplementary Material. As hypothesized, perceived risks positively 
predicted outrage (H1, B = .50, SE = .13, p < .001, [.221, .729]), fear (H2, B = .72, SE = .12, 
p < .001, [.477, .945]) and political efficacy (H3b, B = .29, SE = .14, p = .046, [.011, .565]), 
                                                             
7 The sample size was reduced to N = 97 when we used the listwise deletion method. Only a 
few differences were noted in the results. Politicized identification did not predict collective 
action (B = .24, SE = .13, p = .069, [-.019, .502]) and was not a mediator between perceived 
risks and collective action (.12, SE = .08, p = .089, [-.010, .319]). However, perceived risks 
predicted moral obligation (B = .52, SE = .11, p < .001, [.318, .726]) and indirectly predicted 
action intentions through moral obligation (.16, SE = .08, p = .030, [.039, .370]). Participative 
efficacy did not predict moral obligation (N = 99, B = .17, SE = .10, p = .075, [-.017, .361]).  
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identity consolidation efficacy (H4b, B = .41, SE = .13, p = .001, [.152, .654]), participative 
efficacy (H5b, B = .54, SE = .11, p < .001, [.283, .729]), and politicized identification (H6, B 
= .47, SE = .11, p < .001, [.242, .660]).  
Also as expected (H7, H8, H9, and H11, respectively), politicized identification (B 
= .28, SE = .10, p = .006, [.081, .471]), participative efficacy (B = .24, SE = .09, p = .009, 
[.044, .410]), identity consolidation efficacy (B = .24, SE = .08, p = .005, [.073, .399]), and 
outrage (B = .27, SE = .06, p < .001, [.157, .388]) positively predicted moral obligation. 
However, contrary to H10a/b, political efficacy (B = -.08, SE = .07, p = .266, [-.214, .065]) 
did not predict moral obligation.  
Politicized identification (B = .31, SE = .13, p = .019, [.062, .582]) and moral 
obligation (H13; B = .29, SE = .11, p = .011, [.086, .531]) positively predicted collective 
action intentions. Contrary to H12, fear (B = -.04, SE = .06, p = .477, [-.153, .071]) did not 
predict collective action. The model explained 63% of the variance in collective action 
intentions.  
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Table 5: Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-order Correlations (Study 3) 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Likelihood of Risk 3.77 .86 1.000          
2. Outrage 4.33 1.13 .53** 1.000         
3. Fear 2.76 1.29 .43** .33** 1.000        
4. Political Efficacy 3.46 1.07 .26* .23* .01 1.000       
5. Identity Consolidation Efficacy  3.98 .91 .44** .49** .22* .57** 1.000      
6. Participative Efficacy 3.62 1.08 .54** .61** .24* .51** .66** 1.000     
7. Politicized Identification 3.73 1.02 .56** .68** .33** .40** .59** .78** 1.000    
8. Moral Obligation 4.11 1.03 .60** .74** .33** .26** .58** .71** .75** 1.000   
9. Future Collective Action 4.32 1.10 .47** .67** .22** .34** .56** .67** .73** .71** 1.000  
10. Past Involvement  2.70 1.02 .46* .52** .07 .17 .31** .48** .56** .51** .54** 1.000 
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Table 6: Means, Standard Deviations for Perceived Risks (Study 3) 
Perceived Risks M (SD) 
Risking employment/expel from university 3.53 (1.09) 
Being harassed by the police 4.08 (1.12) 
Being harassed by the gangsters  4.22 (1.04) 
Having a family member harassed by the police  3.34 (1.18) 
Having a family member harassed by the gangsters  3.50 (1.16) 
Being arrested  4.23 (.91) 
Being imprisoned, detained for some time  3.86 (1.02) 
Being tortured  3.37 (1.27) 
Note: The items were rated on five-point scales ranging from very unlikely (1) to very likely 
(5) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Results of path analysis in the Hong Kong sample (Study 1, N = 115). The dashed 
arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the standardized regression 
estimates. *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Past involvement in protests was considered as a 
covariate. It positively predicted outrage (β = .34***), participative efficacy (β = .26**), and 
politicized identification (β = .37***).   
 
 
Importantly, and consistent with the idea that risks imposed by the authorities can 
incite further resistance, there was a significant positive total path from perceived risks to 
action intentions (.39, SE = .15, p = .008, [.071, .648]) and perceived risks indirectly 
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predicted action intentions through politicized identification (.15, SE = .07, p = .045, 
[.033, .337]).  
In sum, our findings yet again confirm politicized identification to be the strongest 
predictor of collective action in repressive contexts, and, in line with previous research 
(Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas et al., 2012), that its effect is partially mediated by moral 
obligation. Our results closely reverberate Tsung-an’s (2017) detailed personal account of the 
protests where she considered the formation of a community, based on a shared identity, 
trust, solidarity, cooperation and personal initiatives, to be the nucleus of the movement. 
Consistent with the idea that repression can galvanize resistance, perceived risks positively 
predicted outrage, the three facets of perceived efficacy and politicized identification and had 
a total positive effect on action intentions through politicized identification. These results are 
again in line with the backfire effect of authority sanctions and delineate the specific “micro-
mobilization” processes that underlie resistance in the face of repression (Opp & Roehl, 
1990, p. 523). In particular, the positive link between perceived risks and political efficacy 
resonates with Tsung-gang’s (2017) description of the events, which suggested that protesters 
perceived the violent repression as a sign of the authorities’ weakness in withstanding the 
protests. Similarly, our finding of moral obligation as an important motivator of action 
complements Tsung-gan’s (2017) elaboration on the paramount importance of protesters’ 
“general feeling that something had to be done” (p. 381) and their personal sense of 
responsibility.  
Study 4: Turkey 
Turkey witnessed a wave of recent protests that started in May 2013. The initial 
protest movement had the aim to prevent the destruction of Gezi Park in Istanbul and the 
construction of a shopping mall (Bilgin, 2013). By May 31st 2013, the environmentally 
oriented protests changed into political protests against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
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Erdoğan’s perceived authoritarian and anti-democratic rule once the police violently 
repressed the peaceful protests in an attempt to evict the protesters from the park (Gokay & 
Shain, 2013; Morris, 2013). The protests in Gezi Park were forcibly evicted from the park on 
June 25th 2013; however, numerous protests still took place against the government-led 
urbanization and regeneration projects across the country (e.g., Hevsel, Yırca, Sulukule, and 
Okmeydanı). These projects were developed with no consultation with the local residents nor 
environmental considerations or monitoring. The government also amended the laws to 
facilitate these projects and used force to suppress any attempted resistance (Pierini, 2013).  
During Gezi and related protests, the police repeatedly used water cannons, tear gas, 
and rubber bullets to disperse the protesters; hundreds of protesters were arrested, thousands 
injured, and eleven killed (Alexander, 2013; Amnesty International, 2015). Moreover, the 
government suppressed the press, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, and 
controlled the judicial system (e.g., unfair trials of anyone questioning authorities’ rule) 
(Harrington, 2015). On March 25th 2015, new reforms gave the police wider powers to 
repress resistance through detentions and the use of firearms (Amnesty International, 2015).  
Method 
Procedure and Respondents 
 On May 22, 2015, we launched an online survey at Özyeğin University in Istanbul. 
The link to the survey was sent to students taking psychology classes8. A total of 316 
                                                             
8 We designed the study as an experiment where we manipulated the likelihood of risks (high 
vs. low). To ensure a greater variability in the participants’ past protests involvement, hence, 
a greater likelihood of them believing the manipulation, we targeted students. However, there 
was no significant difference in perceived risks between conditions (t(294) = .484, p = .628). 
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participants entered the survey. After deleting the data of 20 participants who either left the 
survey immediately after the informed consent or before completing any measures, or 
completed some measures but none of our focal variables, the final sample was composed of 
296 participants (178 women, 116 men, and 3 preferred not to answer; Mage = 21.86, SD = 
1.761). Most participants (35.8%) were psychology major students and the majority (89.5%) 
were of Turkish ethnic background. The majority had some level of past participation in 
collective action; 0.4% were protest organizers, 4.1% were regular protesters, 21.9% were 
occasional protesters, and 27.8% were active on social networks.  
Measures  
One of the authors, a native speaker, translated the survey to Turkish. We measured 
past involvement in protests, likelihood of risks (7 items, α = .87), political efficacy (2 goals, 
e.g., "stop further unwanted urbanization across the country", "prevent further building in 
green spaces in Istanbul", r = .66, p < .001), identity consolidation efficacy (2 goals, r = .61, 
p < .001), participative efficacy (r = .53, p < .001), politicized identification (α = .90), and 
moral obligation (α = .91) using the same measures as in the previous study but adapted to 
the Turkish context. Although other items related to the political context were also included, 
these were not part of the present analysis. Along with past involvement in protests, gender (1 
= Male, 2 = Female) was included as a control variable as it significantly correlated with the 
model variables.    
Emotions. On a five-point scale ranging from not at all (1) to a great extent (5), 
participants evaluated how outraged and fearful they were of Turkish police’s treatment of 
protesters (e.g., "When thinking about how the Turkish police is likely to treat the protesters, 
                                                             
Consequently, we decided to use the data as a survey data, while controlling for experimental 
condition (1 = low risks, 2 = high risks). 
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to what extent do you feel: 1) afraid of the consequences for protesters 2) outraged about the 
police’s behavior").  
Future collective action. Participants rated their willingness to engage in six peaceful 
collective actions as part of the upcoming protests against the government-led urban 
regeneration projects in Turkey using a five-point scale ranging from not at all willing (1) to 
extremely willing (5) (e.g., "demonstrate peacefully", "participate in marches", "participate in 
strikes", "sign petitions", "express disapproal of urbanization on social networks", and 
"participate in sit-ins"; α = .89). 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. We present the means, standard deviations and Pearson 
correlations between the variables in Table 7 and the means and standard deviations for 
responses to each individual item related to perceived risks in Table 8. The means on all the 
items were significantly higher than the midpoint, and some items almost approached the 
highest score of 5 (i.e., being injured and detained), suggesting these risks were highly 
relevant to our participants during this particular period. Outrage, fear, likelihood of risk, as 
well as political and identity consolidation efficacies had less than 5% of missing values. The 
remaining variables had missing values ranging between 5.7 and 15.5%. Little MCAR test 
was significant, χ²(2006) = 2302.979, p < .001, indicating that the overall distribution of 
missing data is not completely at random.  
We inspected whether there are any consistent patterns in the relations between 
missingness on single variables and the available data. Past participation positively correlated 
with missingness for fear (r = .125, p < .05), perceived risks (r = .162, p < .01) and political 
efficacy (r = .162, p < .01), suggesting that those who were politically more active were more 
likely to have missing values on these variables, possibly due to their fear of being 
monitored. Moreover, past participation negatively correlated with missingness for 
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participative efficacy (r = - .145, p < .01) suggesting, as argued previously, participants with 
lower levels of involvement in protests to be less likely to answer some of the questions 
related directly to activism. Given these systematic relationships between the main constructs 
and missing values, we concluded the pattern of missing values to be at random (MAR), used 
FIML to address the issue of missing values, and reported the differences between this 
method and listwise deletion9. 
                                                             
9 The sample size was reduced to N = 229 when we used the listwise deletion method. Only 
two differences were noted in the results; the direct path from fear to collective action only 
approached significance (B = .16, SE = .08, p = .054, [-.003, .325]) and fear emerged as a 
predictor of moral obligation (B = .17, SE = .08, p = .033, [.014, .320]). 
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Table 7: Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-order Correlations (Study 4) 
 
Means SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Likelihood of Risk 3.96 .73 1.000           
2. Outrage 4.22 1.18 .44** 1.000          
3. Fear 4.38 .98 .54** .67** 1.000         
4. Political Efficacy 2.31 .86 .00 -.02 -.01 1.000        
5. Identity Consolidation Efficacy  3.36 .75 .25** .23** .39** .43** 1.000       
6. Participative Efficacy 2.91 .98 .13** .17** .16** .14* .23** 1.000      
7. Politicized Identification 3.35 .88 .31** .37** .45** .02 .29** .27** 1.000     
8. Moral Obligation 3.22 1.00 .42** .43** .50** .10 .32** .28** .59** 1.000    
9. Future Collective Action 3.43 1.01 .46** .51** .58** .16** .42** .27** .58** .64** 1.000   
10. Past Involvement  2.00 1.15 .23** .28** .29* .17** .23** .14* .31** .44** .42** 1.000  
11. Gender (1 Male, 2 Female) - - .23** .19** .30** -.04 .21** .12 .31** .33** .35** .19** 1.000 
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Table 8: Means, Standard Deviations for Perceived Risks (Study 4) 
Perceived Risks M (SD) 
Risking being expelled from university  3.43 (1.08) 
Phones tapped by the police 4.06 (.96) 
Being injured 4.45 (.77) 
Being arrested  4.35 (.81) 
Being detained for sometime 4.39 (.81) 
Being imprisoned 3.67 (1.03) 
Being killed  3.34 (1.20) 
Note: The items were rated on five-point scales ranging from very unlikely (1) to very likely 
(5) 
 
Path analysis. We summarize the results in Figure 5 and report the detailed analysis 
in Table S7 in the Supplementary Material. As hypothesized, perceived risks positively 
predicted outrage (H1; B = .62, SE = .08, p < .001, [.451 .771]), fear (H2; B = .64, SE = .07, p 
< .001, [.503, .767]), identity consolidation efficacy (H4b; B = .30, SE = .07, p < .001, 
[.164, .433]), and politicized identification (H6; B = .26, SE = .06, p < .001, [.142, .381]). 
Perceived risks did not, however, predict political efficacy (H3a/b; B = -.03, SE = .08, p 
= .663, [-.186, .120]) or participative efficacy (H5; B = .12, SE = .07, p = .105, [-.022, .267]).  
Confirming hypotheses H7 and H8, politicized identification (B = .42, SE = .08, p 
< .001, [.284, .575]) and participative efficacy (B = .10, SE = .04, p = .030, [.007, .180]) 
positively predicted moral obligation. However, contrary to our hypotheses, identity 
consolidation efficacy (H9; B = .03, SE = .05, p = .518, [-.065, .143]), political efficacy 
(H10a/b; B = .04, SE = .06, p = .461, [-.071, .153]), and outrage (H11; B = .05, SE = .04, p 
= .238, [-.029, .150]) did not predict moral obligation.  
Outrage (B = .11, SE = .05, p = .025, [.016, .213]), identity consolidation efficacy (B 
= .18, SE = .06, p = .002, [.058, .293]), politicized identification (B = .28, SE = .07, p < .001, 
[.143, .428]), and moral obligation (H13; B = .24, SE = .06, p < .001, [.124, .363]) positively 
predicted collective action intentions. Contrary to expectations, fear (H12; B = .12, SE = .05, 
p =.049, [.002, .242]) positively predicted action intentions and had an indirect positive path 
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to willingness to engage in collective action through moral obligation (.03, SE = .02, p 
= .090, [.001, .066]). Political efficacy (B = .09, SE = .05, p = .081, [-.008, .208]) and 
participative efficacy (B = .02, SE = .05, p = .587, [-.067, .116]) did not predict action 
intentions. Perceived risks (B = .12, SE = .07, p = .060, [-.021, .254]) had no direct link to 
collective action. The model explained 58% of the variance in participants’ action intentions.  
Perceived risks indirectly predicted collective action (.38, SE = .06, p < .001, 
[.263, .498]) specifically through fear (.08, SE = .04, p = .050, [.003, .156]), outrage (.07, SE 
= .03, p = .038, [.011, .144]), identity consolidation efficacy (.06, SE = .02, p = .012, 
[.018, .104]), politicized identification (.07, SE = .03, p = .009, [.029, .141]), and moral 
obligation (.04, SE = .02, p = .017, [.017, .095]). The total path from perceived risks to 
collective action was positive and significant (.50, SE = .07, p < .001, [.352, .642]).  
 
 
Figure 5: Results of path analysis in the Turkish sample (Study 4, N = 296). The dashed 
arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the standardized regression 
estimates. *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Past involvement in protests and gender were 
considered as covariates. Past involvement positively predicted fear (β = .14***), outrage (β 
= .18***), political efficacy (β = .20***), politicized identification (β = .24***), moral 
obligation (β = .21***), and collective action (β = .13**). Gender predicted fear (β = .16**), 
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identity consolidation efficacy (β = .17**), and politicized identification (β = .21***). The 
manipulation did not predict any of the variables. 
 
Overall, these findings further confirm most of our hypotheses (i.e., backlash effect 
through outrage, the role of participative efficacy as a predictor over and above the 
‘traditional’ predictors of collective action), and highlight the importance of politicized 
identification as the strongest predictor of collective action intentions in high-risk contexts. 
Contrary to hypothesis H12, however, fear positively predicted collective action intentions. A 
possible explanation for this positive link could be that in contexts where civil resistance is 
strongly repressed, a reality reflected in the mean of perception of risks and the individual 
item of “being killed”, people often also act out of fear in an attempt to avert threats, 
particularly if they believe that not acting can make the situation worse. Particular to the 
Turkish context, participants might been afraid of Turkey becoming an authoritarian regime. 
Hence, fear of such repressive developments in the country, rather than only outrage towards 
authorities, might have encouraged some to get engaged.    
We refer to the particular Turkish context to explain the non-significance of political 
efficacy to predict collective action. During the 2013 and more recent protests, the protesters 
were harshly repressed, imprisoned, and even killed. Recent laws expanded police authority 
to use force against the protesters. As no significant changes to the political system were 
implemented after the protests (Böcü, 2015), protesters’ belief that the protests can make a 
difference might not be strong enough to motivate them to take action under considerable 
risks. However, the likelihood of achieving a strengthened opposition movement, 
identification with the protest movement, and one’s sense of moral responsibility to take 
action significantly predicted willingness to engage in collective action. These results 
resonate with Letsch’s (2014) report of the Gezi Park protests.  
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Meta-Analysis 
To integrate the results from the four studies more formally and strengthen our 
conclusions, we tested our proposed model meta-analytically (Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016). 
Since the parameter estimates were not independent (i.e., several parameters are estimated 
per study), we could not follow the univariate meta-analysis techniques. Hence, we used the 
meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM), which is a multivariate method of 
meta-analyzing data whereby the dependence among the different correlation matrices is 
accounted for (Cheung, 2015a, 2015b). Specifically, MASEM integrates two statistical 
analyses; structural equation modeling and meta-analysis (Cheung & Cheung, 2014; Cheung 
& Hafdahl, 2016). It allows researchers to test a specific model, and the significance of direct 
and indirect effects across the different samples. In the correlation-based MASEM, the 
correlation matrices from different studies are synthesized, and the specific model under 
study is fitted to the merged correlation matrix (Cheung, 2015a, 2015b).  
We conducted MASEM using the R software and a code developed by Cheung 
(2015a, 2015b). We used the fixed-effect model since the primary purpose here was to 
provide a summary of the results and not infer the distribution of the effect sizes, nor to 
attempt to generalize the results beyond the four present studies (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). 
The fixed-effects in MASEM, based on weighted least squares estimation, is similar to the 
fixed-effects meta-analysis based on generalized least squares estimation. We followed the 
WLS estimation method since the distribution of the data is not normal. We examined the 
95% Likelihood Based Intervals for significance and report the standardized coefficients. 
These procedures ensure the validity of the estimates since they are unbiased (e.g., 
independent of the sample sizes of each study; Cheung, 2015a, 2015b). The iterations for the 
tested model and the parameters converged with no errors in the analysis as the OpenMx 
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Status was 0, which shows that the results are the best solution for the given data (Cheung 
2015a, 2015b).  
We summarize the results in Figure 6 and report the detailed analysis in Table S9 in 
the Supplementary Material. Consistent with our hypotheses,  perceived risks negatively 
predicted political efficacy (H3a; β = -.08, SE = .03, p = .025, [-.147, -.010]), and positively 
predicted fear (H1; β = .48, SE = .03, p < .001, [.417, .537]), outrage (H2; β = .40, SE = .03, p 
< .001, [.338, .467]), identity consolidation efficacy (H4a; β = .16, SE = .04, p < .001, 
[.094, .233]), participative efficacy (H5a; β = .11, SE = .03, p = .002, [.041, .177]), politicized 
identification (H6; β = .29, SE = .03, p < .001, [.229, .352]), and moral obligation (H7; β 
= .11, SE = .03, p = .002, [.042, .179]).  
Regarding the prediction of moral obligation, in line with our hypotheses, politicized 
identification (H7; β = .35, SE = .03, p < .001, [.290, .409]), participative efficacy (H8; β 
= .19, SE = .03, p < .001, [.134, .246]), and outrage (H11; β = .16, SE = .03, p < .001, 
[.106, .221]) were positive predictors. Identity consolidation efficacy (H7; β = .06, SE = .03, 
p = .052, [-.001, .118]) and political efficacy (H10a/b; β = -.04, SE = .03, p = .144, 
[-.096, .014]) did not predict moral obligation. Finally, moral obligation (H13; β = .30, SE 
= .04, p < .001, [.235, .369]) positively predicted collective action intentions. Disconfirming 
H12, fear (β = -.04, SE = .03, p = .233, [-.095, .023]) did not predict action intentions (please 
refer to Table 9 for a summary of the tested hypotheses across the four contexts and the 
MetaSEM). 
Perceived risks indirectly predicted collective action (.16, [.104, .217]) specifically 
through outrage (.05, [.027, .080]), identity consolidation efficacy (.03, [.014, .044]), 
politicized identification (.06, [.040, .087]), and moral obligation (.03, [.012, .057]). 
Furthermore, outrage (.05, [.030, .072]), participative efficacy (.06, [.038, .081]), and 
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politicized identification (.11, [.078, .137]) indirectly predicted collective action intentions 
through moral obligation.  
 
Figure 6: Results of Meta-SEM. The coefficients are the standardized regression estimates. 
*p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Past involvement in protests was considered as covariate. Past 
involvement positively predicted outrage (β = .27***), political efficacy (β = .27***), 
identity consolidation efficacy (β = .21***), participative efficacy (β = .15***), politicized 
identification (β = .35***), moral obligation (β = .18), and collective action (β = .15***).  
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Table 9: Summary of tested hypotheses 
 
 
General Discussion 
Social psychological theorizing on collective action has progressed considerably over 
the past decade (see van Zomeren, 2016), yet empirical work on this topic has been limited to 
relatively low-risk actions in democratic and liberal Western countries. Consequently, the 
wider applicability of the emerging models is uncertain (see Opp, 2009), especially with 
respect to the motivators of collective action in repressive contexts. The present research 
aimed to address this limitation and pursued three main goals. 
First, we specified a comprehensive predictive model of collective action intentions, 
which takes into account recent theoretical developments by distinguishing different 
emotions, dimensions of efficacy, and politicized identification as key antecedents, and 
examined its value in predicting collective action intentions in four different contexts marked 
by high levels of repression of activism. The model had high explanatory power, accounting 
for between 46% (Ukraine) and 72% (Russia) of the variability in collective action intentions.  
 Studies 
 1:Russia 2: Ukraine 3: Hong Kong 4: Turkey MetaSEM 
Hypotheses   
 
    
H1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
H2 ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ 
H3 a/b ✓(a) X ✓(b) X X 
H4 a/b X X ✓(b) ✓(b) ✓(b) 
H5 a/b ✓(b) X ✓(b) X ✓(b) 
H6 ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ 
H7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
H8 X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
H9 ✓ X ✓ X X 
H10 a/b ✓(b) X X X X 
H11 ✓ X ✓ X ✓ 
H12 ✓ X X ✓ X 
H13 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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In line with much other work on collective action (Leach et al., 2006; Stürmer & 
Simon, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008), our findings generally confirm the importance of 
politicized identification and outrage as motivating factors.  
However, political efficacy, which is considered a key factor in motivating action 
across different literatures (Mummendey et al., 1999; Nepstad, 2011; van Zomeren et al., 
2008), was found to be overall non-significant as a predictor in the present contexts, 
indicating that the belief that collective action will achieve its stated political goal might be 
less important in motivating participation in repressive contexts. Rather, action intentions 
were a function of the belief in the action’s ability to build a broader movement (identity 
consolidation efficacy) as well as belief in the importance of one’s personal contribution 
(participative efficacy). This suggests that, although political efficacy is not a predictor, 
collective action in repressive contexts is still strategic, as the factors that pave the way for 
future organization and resistance (see also Drury, Evripidou, & van Zomeren, 2014; 
Hornsey et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2007) might be more relevant than the direct political 
impact of action under these circumstances.  
In fact, the belief that forming such a movement is possible even though it might 
attract “targeted” repression, might result from the belief that mass protests would raise 
awareness about the pressing grievances and provide proof of the illegitimacy of the 
government, consequently would attract national, international and media attention as well as 
support for the protest movement and formation of new alliances (Araj, 2008; Chang, 2008; 
Sutton, Butcher, & Svensson, 2014; Wisler & Giugni, 1999). We acknowledge though, that 
such thinking might be contingent upon individuals highly valuing the social and economic 
demands as well as having an ideology aligned with the demands and/or the movement (see 
DeNardo, 1985). We also acknowledge that repression may increase political or identity 
consolidation efficacies up to a certain level, up until repression is so high that even virtual 
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resistance is impossible, activism consumes all available resources, and individuals start 
feeling hopeless (DeNardo, 1985; Gurr, 1970; Muller & Weede, 1990). 
Thus, our findings further underline the importance of assessing a range of criteria for 
the efficacy of collective action and call for the necessity to explore the factors which render 
political efficacy non-significant as a motivator of collective action in such contexts. 
Following Cichocka et al. (2018), including macro-level contextual factors (e.g., properties of 
the political regime) while exploring the role of external (i.e., political system being open to 
demands) and collective political efficacies in curvilinear relationships between system 
justification and collective action is one potential avenue for future research. It is further 
notable that the emotion of fear, which previous laboratory-based research has found to be a 
strong inhibitor of collective action (Miller et al., 2009), did not emerge as a significant 
predictor of action in the present research and in one study (Turkey) even positively predicted 
action intentions.  
While this seems counter-intuitive and inconsistent with theory on the role of 
emotions in shaping behavior (Dumont, et al. 2003), a number of approaches can account for 
this finding. According to emotion theory and previous research, fear can sometimes lead to 
(defensive) aggressive or confrontational action, especially when the opponent is an out-
group threatening one’s in-group (Simunovic, Mifune, & Yamagishi, 2013; Spanovic, Lickel, 
Denson, & Petrovic, 2010). Moreover, psychological reactance theory argues that 
infringements on one’s freedom can lead to defensive reactions as well as backlash (Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981), and Witte (1992, 1996) hypothesized that when the perceived threat and 
perceived efficacy to confront the threat is high, fear would predispose individuals to be more 
prone to cognitively and deliberately confront the danger. He further hypothesizes that fear 
can lead to a boomerang effect when the threat is excessive and the perceived efficacy is low. 
These effects might be particularly strong in repressive contexts, since the existence of the 
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group is directly threatened and not acting might signal hesitation and encourage even 
harsher repression in the future. The overall null effect of fear as a predictor in the present 
research might result from different people reacting in different ways to the perceived 
repression.  
The second goal of our research was to determine how the risks associated with 
activism feed into the psychological antecedents of collective action and thus impact on 
willingness to get engaged. Consistent with the idea of a backlash effect of repression (e.g., 
Hess & Martin, 2006), we found that the perceived risks attached to activism positively 
predicted future action tendencies, over and above current involvement, and that this was 
explained through outrage, increased politicized identification, and increased identity 
consolidation and participative efficacies. These findings shed some light on the so-called 
“micro-mobilization” processes that are assumed to underlie this effect (Opp, 1990). 
Specifically, our findings suggest that state repression galvanizes protesters because it 
arouses feelings of outrage, strengthens commitment to the attacked social movement, 
heightens people’s perception that their own contribution is valuable and strengthens the 
belief that broader support for the movement can be garnered through further action. 
Interestingly, we found little evidence overall and a consistent pattern only in Russia of a 
deterrent effect through the arousal of fear in our data. While perceived risk was a strong 
predictor of fear, as we had hypothesized, fear did not emerge as a predictor of action as 
discussed above.  
The third goal of the current work was to further explore the importance of a sense of 
moral obligation in motivating engagement. Based on some initial work on this construct 
(Nepstad, 2004; Opp, 1994; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012), we 
considered moral obligation to be the most proximal antecedent of collective action in our 
model. Consistent with this prior work, we found moral obligation to be a significant 
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predictor of action intentions and to partially mediate the effects of identification, efficacy, 
and emotion. Thus, our work further highlights the importance of group processes in creating 
a sense of obligation to act (Atran, 2016; Atran & Ginges, 2015; Stürmer & Simon, 2004, 
Villas & Sabucedo, 2012). Interestingly, the inclusion of this variable allowed us to further 
understand the relationship between political efficacy and action intentions, which varies 
widely in the literature (e.g., see Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008). In Study 1 
we obtained a negative indirect relation between political efficacy and action intentions via 
moral obligation, which suggests the existence of a “free rider effect” (Olson, 1968) whereby 
the experienced obligation to act is reduced to the extent to which individuals feel that the 
protest movement will achieve its goals. Future research needs to further explore this link and 
its moderators to shed light on the conditions and individual factors that determine when and 
why a sense of duty to support a social movement is aroused or undermined.      
Limitations of the Present Research  
We acknowledge a number of limitations of this research. First, we relied on internet-
based convenience samples rather than on random or nationally representative ones, which 
limits the generalizability of our findings. However, our purpose was primarily to understand 
how activists and individuals with a certain level of past participation in collective action 
respond to perceived risks, and why they engage in high-risk collective action. Furthermore, 
the practical constraints of conducting research in such risky and highly dynamic contexts 
made other forms of data collection difficult. Note however that research has underlined the 
validity and contribution of ‘internet’ samples (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004).  
Furthermore, although, the main aim of the current research was to assess the role of 
repression in shaping the willingness to get engaged for individuals who were already or 
likely to be involved in the protest movements under investigation, it is important to test the 
hypothesized predictions in the vast majority of the population who have no past experiences 
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of collective action and who typically refrain from protesting. Future studies should examine 
whether repression spurs protests not only for a small percentage of devoted activists but also 
within the mainstream population, or whether repression has a deterring effect for those who 
have no past experiences of collective action. For instance, as politicized identification 
emerged as one of the most significant predictors of action intentions under risk, future 
research can examine whether in-group norms of resisting risks, helping fellow in-group 
members in times of need, and/or overcoming fear shape individuals’ motivation to take 
action. In fact, previous research has highlighted how in-group norms shape the costs and 
benefits that are considered important (Hornsey, Blackwood, & O’Brien, 2005; Livingstone 
& Haslam, 2008; Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005), as well as emotions and beliefs (Thomas 
McGarty, & Mavor, 2009).  
Conversely, related to identity and norms, one can speculate that people who are 
already highly involved in the movement might have internalized the emotional, efficacy and 
identity norms of the movement (Thomas et al., 2009), making it less likely that these will be 
shifted as a function of perceived risks. Rather, it is people on the side lines of a movement 
who respond most strongly to the imposition of risk and are drawn further into activism. 
Hence, considering past participation as a moderator, extending the present work to non-
activist population, and systematically comparing non-activists and activists through 
experimental and longitudinal studies is important as the relations between variables might be 
different for a non-activist population. To explain how various populations respond to 
perceived risks and how this shapes willingness to challenge or promote the state, one can 
also consider the role of system-level emotions (Solak, Jost, Suemer, & Clore, 2012). Positive 
system-level emotions such as pride, admiration, and gratitude regarding the system may 
alleviate the perception of the gravity of the use of repression against system-challengers and 
tamper the outrage towards this repression.  
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Second, our reliance on cross-sectional data precludes inferences about the causal 
relations between these variables and does not allow us to rule out the influence of third 
variables that were not directly controlled for. This is a common problem in field research on 
collective action, which does not easily lend itself to experimentation. To address the issue of 
causality at least partly, we included a measure of current activism as a control variable in all 
models to ensure that the observed relationships represent shifts in action intentions over and 
above previous levels of involvement. Hence, the possibility that level of involvement can act 
as a third variable that can explain relations between the variables (e.g., perceived risks and 
emotions) is reduced, and the presented associations are all based on the residuals of 
regression between past participation and the various dependent variables.  
Moreover, although our analyses were guided by established theory and prior 
research, we acknowledge that the causal relations between variables are also likely to be 
reciprocal and some variables are likely to arise more or less simultaneously. Alternative 
specifications therefore cannot be excluded, and further experimental and longitudinal studies 
are required. For example, while our focus on prediction led us to consider politicized 
identification at the same level as the other antecedents, two recent integrative models of 
collective action, the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 
2008) and the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA; Thomas et 
al., 2009, 2011) offer alternative specifications of the role of this variable. Specifically, while 
SIMCA considers identification to be an antecedent of injustice and efficacy perceptions, 
EMSICA suggests that identification is an outcome of these variables as outrage and efficacy 
perceptions may motivate individuals to identify with a movement. Consistent with Thomas 
et al., (2012), we suspect that different causal specifications might be valid in different 
contexts and/or relevant to people who are at different stages of involvement in collective 
action. One might argue that EMSICA is more relevant for individuals who are at the early 
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stages of their involvement (Thomas et al., 2009, 2012), while SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 
2008) could be more pertinent for more ‘seasoned’ activists, since their identification with the 
protest movement can further feed into their outrage and efficacy beliefs. As we anticipated 
our samples to include activists at different stages of their involvement, we considered 
politicized identification to be at the same level as the remaining antecedents of collective 
action, and moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of collective action. 
In the same line, the current model considers moral obligation as the most proximal 
predictor of collective action (Sabucedo et al., 2018; Sabucedo, Dono. Grigoryev, Gómez-
Román, & Alzate, 2019), although we acknowledge that Milesi and Alberici (2016) have 
suggested and provided support for politicized identification being the most proximal 
predictor of collective action and moral obligation a predictor of politicized identification.  
Although we suggest alternative models, our results across the four contexts and 
MetaSEM advocate a direct link between the antecedents of collective action and action 
intention that are not fully mediated by moral obligation. Hence, while we propose different 
models which are theoretically possible, there is clear evidence in our datasets that moral 
obligation is a proximal predictor of collective action and that moral obligation and 
politicized identification are distinct constructs with unique explanatory power. 
Interactive relationships between the key variables are also plausible. While 
considering this question in detail is beyond the scope of the present paper, a number of 
supplementary analyses indicate that both perceived risk and politicized identification can 
moderate the impact of other variables on collective action tendencies10. For example, the 
                                                             
10 We conducted a series of analyses testing for the potential moderating role of likelihood of 
risk using PROCESS Model 59 for multiple moderated-mediation models. In Study 2, 
political efficacy significantly interacted with likelihood of risks in predicting moral 
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obligation (-15, SE = .07, p = .033, [-.289, -.012]), such that political efficacy significantly 
predicted moral obligation only at low levels of perceived risks (B = .26, SE = .10, p = .010, 
[.064, .465]), and moral obligation was not a significant mediator in the relation between 
political efficacy and collective action at any level of perceived risks. Identity consolidation 
efficacy significantly interacted with likelihood of risks in predicting moral obligation (-18, 
SE = .09, p = .037, [-.350, -.011]). However, the simple slopes were not significant. When 
looking at the pattern, identity consolidation efficacy was positively associated with moral 
obligation at low and moderate levels of risks and negatively at high levels. Moral obligation 
was not a significant mediator in the relation between identity consolidation efficacy and 
collective action at any level of perceived risks. In Study 3, political efficacy interacted with 
perceived risks in predicting moral obligation (-.13, SE = .05, p = .017, [-.243, -.025]). 
Political efficacy negatively predicted moral obligation only at high levels of perceived risks 
(B = .17, SE = .07, p = .018, [-.301, - 028]). Moral obligation was not a significant mediator 
at any level of perceived risks. No other interactions were significant. 
We conducted a simple moderation (model 1), where we examined the moderation effect of 
likelihood of risk in the relation between moral obligation and collective action. In Study 2, 
the interaction was significant (.13, SE = .06, p = .028, [.014, .239]). Moral obligation 
predicted collective action only at high levels of likelihood of risks (B = .28, SE = .10, p 
= .008, [.072, .482]). In Study 3, moral obligation significantly interacted with likelihood of 
risk (-.17, SE = .05, p = .001, [-.265, -.069]), and predicted collective action at low (B = .38, 
SE = .11, p = .001, [.155, .608]) and moderate (B = .24, SE = .11, p = .038, [.013, .485]) 
levels of perceived risks. 
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results of the moderation analyses across the contexts showed very few significant 
interactions and an inconsistent pattern that varied across contexts. The significant 
interactions obtained suggest perceived risks to play a significant moderating role in the 
relation between political efficacy and moral obligation, but in different ways in different 
contexts. When risks are low, political efficacy positively predicts moral obligation in Study 
2, however, at very high levels, it negatively predicts moral obligation in Study 3. Moreover, 
moral obligation was a significant positive predictor of collective action at high levels of risks 
in Study 2, and at low and moderate levels in Study 3. These results suggest that the impact 
of risk, particularly whether or not the free rider effect emerges and whether a sense of 
obligation leads to action, varies across contexts. Future research is needed to shed light on 
this and explore the potential factors leading to these differences. In line with the curvilinear 
effect, contextual factors such as the level and length of time of repression might be of 
relevance.   
Moreover, politicized identification moderated some paths from perceived risks. 
Specifically, in Studies 3 and Study 4 perceived risk predicted some of the antecedents of 
collective action only at low and moderate levels of politicized identification (i.e., outrage 
and moral obligation in Hong Kong and identity consolidation efficacy in Turkey), 
suggesting that highly identified individuals, who are likely to have internalized the 
emotional and efficacy norms of the movement, might be less affected by repressive actions. 
Moreover, activists probably already hold specific (negative) views of the authorities, and the 
use of repression only confirms their views. However, in Study 4 (Russia), for participants 
who were highly identified, perceived risks actually negatively predicted their identity 
consolidation efficacy. Within the Russian context, repression has been present for years, 
hence, those who highly identify with the movement might also be very knowledgeable of the 
resources and possibilities to further consolidate their movement when repression is very 
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high. Consequently, their efficacy beliefs decrease. The fact that we found only few 
significant interactions can be due to the cross-sectional nature of the data as well as power 
issues. Future research could examine these patterns further using longitudinal and 
experimental designs. 
Finally, even though our model explained a substantial amount of variance in 
collective action intentions, we should emphasize that the current work does not represent a 
complete analysis of the factors underlying collective action in high-risk contexts. While we 
focused on the three main groups of explanatory variables (see van Zomeren et al., 2008), a 
range of other factors, such as existing social networks and levels of political knowledge 
(Louis, Amiot, Thomas, & Blackwood, 2016), as well as experienced positive emotions such 
as pride (Tausch & Becker, 2013) are likely to play a role and could be considered in follow-
up studies. Reciprocal emotions and affective ties within a movement (e.g., love and loyalty, 
Jasper, 1997, 1998) may also be of relevance in initiating and sustaining action under high 
risk (DiGrazia, 2014; Jasper, 1998; Loveman, 1998; Nepstad, 2004; Nepstad & Smith, 1999; 
Opp & Roehl, 1990).  
An important future step is to include ideological constructs in our model such as 
political ideology and system justification as these constructs shape how people perceive and 
respond in a particular context/conflict and the alignment of one’s political ideologies and the 
ideology and values conveyed in a protest movement is an important factor in motivating one 
to get politically engaged and sustain one’s engagement (Jost, Becker, Osborne, & Badaan, 
2017; Klandermans, Werner, & van Doorn, 2008; Langer, Jost, Bonneau et al., 2019; 
Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, 2017; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007, 
2010). For instance, ideological beliefs, values, and norms can shape participants’ perception 
of risks, political efficacy, moral obligation, and dynamics among protesters and between 
protesters and the authorities (e.g., choice of violent vs non-violent collective action) (see 
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Langer, et al., 2019; Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, Abrams, Sidanius et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2017). 
For instance, in this project, the protest movements in Russia, Hong Kong and Turkey 
targeted political repression, however, the Ukrainian protest movement, during the period the 
survey took place, targeted specific governmental policy. Hence, these protests had different 
ideological goals. Such differences might explain some of the differences we found between 
the countries. Ayanian and Tausch (2016) found repression to have differential effects on 
protesters’ efficacy and emotions depending on their political orientation (i.e., anti-Morsi or 
anti-Military). Moreover, individual differences in beliefs in the fairness of the system would 
address issues related to why political efficacy might increase but also indirectly decrease 
collective action (Osborne et al., 2015), as well as why some individuals feel outraged and 
morally obliged to protest against the repression and others do so to a lesser extent or even 
decide to engage in counter-protests to defend the system. The system-level emotions (i.e., 
hope, pride) mentioned above can also mediate the relation between perceived risks, 
politicized identification, ideological or system justifying beliefs, and engagement in 
collective action (Langer et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, research has shown a link between moral reasoning, political affiliation, 
and activism (Gross, 1996; Moreira, Rique Neto, Sabucedo, & Camino, 2018). Schwartz 
(1977) argued for the role of personal values and norms in shaping one’s moral obligation to 
engage in any action. Social values have been linked to moral obligation and altruistic and 
environmental behavior (Kaiser & Byrka, 2011; Lönnqvist, Walkowitz, Wichardt, Lindeman, 
& Verkasalo, 2009; van Lange, de Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). Recently, Sabucedo et 
al. (2019) tested the role of left vs right ideologies and politicized identification in shaping 
participants’ efficacy, affective injustice, and moral obligation, and considered actual 
participation in conventional action (i.e., voting; Study 1), and willingness to engage in non-
conventional action (i.e., cutting off traffics; Study 2) as dependent variables. Their results 
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confirmed ideology to negatively predict moral obligation (Study 2) and collective action 
(Study 1, 2). Moreover, moral obligation was a positive predictor of action in both studies. 
Hence, the inclusion of such ideological and individual-level constructs would ensure a more 
comprehensive and integrative model of collective action in repressive contexts and would be 
highly relevant when extending the model to non-activist samples.  
Contributions and Directions for Future Research 
Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that the present research makes a 
number of valuable contributions to the literature on collective action. To our knowledge, the 
current research is one of the few comprehensive empirical investigations of the predictors of 
collective action tendencies in contexts where protesters face substantial risks due to state 
repression. Unlike past research, which was predominantly conducted in WEIRD (western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Rad, 
Martingano, & Ginges, 2018) contexts, this paper presents some of only a handful of studies 
on the social-psychological predictors of collective action in high-risk contexts (for 
exceptions see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Baysu & Phalet, 2017; Gulevich, Sarieva, Nevruev, 
& Yagiyayev, 2017; Chayinska, Minescu, & McGarty, 2017). These data are unique given 
the practical difficulty of gathering data from activists in such contexts. Our findings suggest 
that the predictive variables identified in prior research overall explain a substantial amount 
of variance in collective action tendencies, but also point to the relatively low importance of 
political efficacy and fear as psychological motivators. These results highlight the importance 
of testing the generalizability of our models in a variety of contexts and call for the 
development of more contextualized theories (see also van Zomeren & Louis, 2017). Our 
research also contributes to our understanding of what is considered one of the main unsolved 
puzzles in the wider collective action literature, namely the question of why people take to 
the streets in the face of severe repression (Opp, 2009). Although the role of repression has 
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been extensively examined at the macro- and meso-level, one cannot fully understand how 
repression shapes resistance without examining the underlying social psychological processes 
set in motion (Opp, 2009). Through considering perceived risks a self-relevant micro-level 
manifestation of repression, we were able to demonstrate how repression can galvanize 
resistance, and point to processes that may determine why repression sometimes works and 
sometimes does not (see also Honari, 2017).  
These initial findings open up potentially fruitful avenues for future research in social 
psychology. Scholars in political science and sociology argue, for example, that different 
types of authority sanctions (institutional/long vs situational/short term) can have differential 
effects on social movements and dissent (Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991). For instance, 
longitudinal and subtle forms of sanctions (e.g., surveillance) are very effective in confining 
collective action, since these measures restrain an opposition movement to develop, without 
endangering the authorities’ legitimacy (Barkan, 2006; Boykoff, 2007). On the other hand, 
situational or short term repression (e.g., violent police intervention during protests) can be 
perceived as illegitimate and indiscriminate, consequently spurring further resistance (see 
also Moore, 1998; Rasler, 1996). By specifically measuring the micro-mobilization processes 
involved in resistance, social-psychological research can provide important new insights into 
the effectiveness of different forms of repression and how to best mobilize resistance against 
them.  
For instance, reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981) might be part of the backlash effect 
demonstrated in the present work. Following Laurin, Kay, and Fitzsimons (2012) work on 
rationalization (Aronson, 1973) and reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981), certainty of 
implementation of repression might moderate the relation between perceived risks and 
willingness to engage in collective action. Specifically, when repression is perceived as 
absolute hindering of freedoms with certainty of implementation, individuals would tend to 
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rationalize the use of force and refrain from engagement in collective action. However, when 
the measures are not absolute and are uncertain, they might react to the use of repression or 
restrictions of freedom with valuing highly the freedom of expressing oneself and engaging 
in collective action, and consequently be willing to engage in action. 
Moreover, the inverted-U curve (DeNardo, 1985; Gurr, 1970; Muller & Weede, 
1990), a theoretical model that aims to explain the link between repression and dissent, 
suggests that mobilization initially increases as a response to modest levels of repression and 
decrease once repression reaches a certain level. An important future direction is to examine 
whether such curvilinear relationship also exists at a micro-level. Specifically, it would be 
interesting to explore what level of repression leads to further collective action through which 
micro-mobilization processes, and at which level of repression action decreases and through 
which processes this occurs. Considering activists’ adaptation strategies to repression, and 
government’s past accommodation and repression strategies (Davenport, 2007; Moore, 2000; 
Moss, 2014) might contribute to an understanding of the differential effects of repression. 
Furthermore, research showed that the form of government might affect the relationship 
between repression and dissent (Abadie, 2004; Davenport, 2007). Specifically, in both highly 
autocratic regimes, typically characterized with very high levels of repression, and 
democratic governments, typically characterized with low levels of repression, resistance is 
the least likely. Furthermore, scholars have also emphasized the bidirectional relationship 
between dissent and repression, whereby resistance leads to repression, and repression in its 
turn leads to more resistance (Carey, 2006). Future studies should examine how such macro-
level factors affect the micro-level individual motivations of protesters in engaging in further 
action.  
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Conclusion 
The present research fills an important gap in the literature by testing a 
comprehensive predictive model of collective action tendencies across a range of high-risk 
contexts. It provides evidence consistent with a galvanizing effect of state repression on 
individuals’ willingness to engage in high-risk collective action and delineates some of the 
“micro-mobilization” processes underlying this effect. Our results have implications that help 
shape the collective action frames that are likely to incite willingness to engage in collective 
action under risk (Reicher et al., 2006) and should therefore be of interest to protest 
movement organizers and activists in general who wish to mobilize resistance in contexts 
where authority repression is prevalent.  
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